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ABSTRACT 
THE ROOTS OF TURKISH LIBERALISM 
Aziz Tuncer 
Department of Political Science and Public Administration 
Supervisor: Prof.Dr. Ahmet Evin 
January, 1997 
This thesis analyzes liberalism in the Ottaman Empire between 1875-
1918 in a political-historical context. First Ottoman Constitution with its 
liberal principles is emphasized as a liberal gains. After the annulment 
of the Constitution until 1908, the struggle of the liberals for 
repromulgation is explained. The role of the omnipotent state 
understanding in the development of Liberalism in Turkish case is 
discussed and compared with German case. The inevitability of 
omnipotent state understanding and liberalism as a means of opposition 
are proposed as the main reasons behind non-germinated Turkish 
Liberalism. 
Keywords: Turkish Liberalism, History 
OZET 
TURK LiBERALiZMiNiN KOKLER1 
Aziz Tuncer 
Siyaset Bilimi ve Kamu Yonetimi Boliimii 
Tez Yoneticisi: Prof. Dr. Ahmet Evin 
Ocak, 1997 
Bu tez 1875-1918 y1llan arasmda Osmanh imparatorlugundaki 
liberalizm iizerine siyasal-tarihsel bir 9ah~madir. 1876 Kanuni Esasi 
iyindeki liberal prensiplere dayamlarak bir liberal ad1m olarak 
anlatilm1~tlr. Kanun-i Esasinin bir yil sonra yiiriirliikten kald1rmas1yla 
1908 'e kadar liberal muhalefetin en gii9lii talebi olmas1 vurgulanm1~tir. 
Bu arada Osmanh liberalizmindeki gii9lii devlet anlay1~mm 
vazge9ilmezliginin nasil bir paradox yaratt1g1 iizerinde durulmu~ ve bu 
noktada Alman liberalizmi ile kar~ila~tinlm1~t1r. Liberalizmin bir 
muhalefet arac1 olarak goriilmesi ise ittihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti 
omeginde ele ahnm1~ ve bunun gii9lii devlet anlay1~1 ile birlikte gii9siiz 
Tiirk liberalizminin ardmdaki sebep oldugu one siiriilmii~tiir. 
Anahtar Kelimeler: Ti.irk Liberalizmi, Tarih 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
LIBERALISM 
Liberalism is one of the most sophisticated ideologies. It has been deeply 
rooted in the cultural life of the West. As Eccleshall claimed, that it has 
explained many major developments since the seventeenth century. 
The word liberal has been used in different senses at different times. Used in 
one sense, liberal connotes such values as progress, tolerance, liberty, 
openness, and individualism. Those values predate liberalism but they were 
. 
equated with the liberal mind after nineteenth century. 1 
Liberal as a political label was used in the Spanish Cortes of 181 O; it refers to 
those who supported a parliament that opposed the power of such estates as 
the nobles, landowners, and clergy.2 Liberals defended, among other things, 
the constitution and the freedom of the press against royal authority. 
For many historians, liberalism emerged in England in the wake of the .1688 
Glorious Revolution, following the Civil War. Liberal opponents of the 
regime were against James II. Their aims can be summarized under two 
headings as follows: religious toleration, which means a fair degree of civil 
and religious freedom guaranteed to the individual, and constitutionalism, 
1 Andrew Vincent, Modern Political Ideologies (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992), 22-23. 
2 J. G. Merquior, Liberalism Old and New (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1991), 2. 
which refers to a polity where royal power is limited. 3 These opposmg 
demands became the main pillars of liberalism. 
Liberalism has core principles but those principles were articulated in a 
different and distinctive fashion by different thinkers. This paved the way to 
diversity in the understanding of liberalism which makes difficult to present it 
as a pure doctrine. As a result, liberalism is perceived as an intricate and 
pervasive ideology. While, under such circumstances, it is not an easy task to 
classify whether a particular state is liberal or not, an examination of the 
origins and historical development of liberalism itself may facilitate to clarify 
liberal characteristics of a state. 
APPROACHES TO THE ORIGIN OF LIBERALISM 
1) Nation-state Based Approach. In this approach liberalism is identified 
with the historical context of nation-states. It emphasizes different political 
and socio-cultural conditions in the development of German, French, and 
British liberalism. Different national traditions have shaped liberalism in 
those countries. The late national unification was an effective factor in the 
development of German liberalism; isolation was influential in the British 
case; and 1789 Revolution substantively affected French liberalism.4 
2) Particular Liberal Ideological Tradition Approach. This approach is 
based on the distinction between British and continental liberalism. British 
liberalism was characterized by empiricism . On the other hand, continental 
3. Ibid.,2. 
4 Vincent, ideologies, 24. 
2 
liberalism, drawing upon the French enlightenment, placed more emphasis on 
abstract reason than experience. 5 
3) Capitalism-Based Approach.In this approach liberalism is equated with 
capitalism. This approach was used generally by socialists in their search for 
liberalism. According to them, private property was the zenith of liberalism 
which was founded upon protection of private property and other principles 
that were adopted solely as a means for masking this reality. 
Liberalism and capitalism developed concomitantly and, today, liberal 
democracies can easily take root in advanced capitalist societies. The 
endeavor to establish liberalism in non-capitalist societies did not succeed . 
. 
From these experiments two different schools flourished. 
On the one hand, Marxists proposed that the relation between capitalism and 
liberalism is more than a supportive one. In other words, liberalism was 
included in capitalism. As a way of life liberalism emphasized economic and 
political values of rising commercial classes. There was a close relationship 
between capitalism and liberalism. But,they claimed it was misleading to 
consider liberalism as being merely a compatible rationale for capitalism. 
Liberalism as a way of life was more than an expression of an economic 
system. It has political, social, and intellectual dimensions. Both in liberalism 
and capitalism required an individualistic world view. Their simultaneous 
development, however, gave rise, among some historians, to the view that 
liberalism was an essential sub-category of capitalism. The view that 
s Ibid. 
3 
liberalism is an essential sub-category of capitalism can be said to be an 
exaggeration. 6 
On the other hand, economists and political scientists, such as Milton 
Freedman and F. A. Hayek, who opposed socialism, claimed that without 
capitalism there would be no liberalism. Economic freedom was not only 
interdependent with other liberties but also the existence of economic liberties 
protected other liberties, because it limited state power.7 Capitalism protected 
and promoted both freedom and variety. 
In supporting the idea that liberalism would survive so long as capitalism did, 
members of the first group overlooked the fact that capitalism was not 
coterminous with liberalism; it also could coexist with other contemporary 
ideologies. 
4) Constitutionalist Approach. This approach identifies the nineteenth-
century constitutionalist tradition as the ongm of liberalism. 
Constitutionalism was one of first and strongest demands of liberals, and later 
liberalism and constitutionalism became coterminous in that tradition. 
Security of an individual's life, honor, and property can be convincingly 
safeguarded only by a constitution which puts definite and inviolable limits 
upon the actions of the state. State must be respectful of the liberal principle 
that each person has the right to govern himself. 8 
6 John Hallowell, The Decline of Liberalism as an Ideology (New York: Howard Fertig, 1971), 12-13 
7 Anthony Arblaster, The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism ( Oxford: Blackwell, 1984), 84-85. 
8 Guido Re Ruggiero, The History of European Liberalism ( Gloucester, Mass, 1981 ), 55-56. 
4 
Constitutionalism became an expression of liberty, smce m the 
constitutionalist approach the state could be defined as the main actor of 
coercion. Instead of being viewed as the traditional enemy of individual 
freedom, the state came to be viewed as the protector of mutual freedoms of 
individuals. 
Constitutionalism elevated and ennobled equality, making individual 
freedoms depend not on the will of a ruler but protect them by means of a 
stable and impartial rule of law9. The monarchial Charters, the early forms of 
constitutionalist work were not based on popular sovereignty, nor did they 
contribute to an agreement between free and equal individuals, but they were 
one-sided concessions by the monarch granted to his subjects, implying that 
sovereignty belonged to the monarch and those rights were given as a master's 
gift. Charters strengthened the authority of the monarch who, through those 
acts, granted royal power by his free will. IO 
As Gray claimed, a liberal political order may take the form of constitutional 
monarchy, but it must contain constitutional restraints on the arbitrary use of 
governmental power. A central tenet of constitutionalists is that power and 
authority should be limited by a system of constitutional rules and practices in 
which individual liberty and equality are respected and protected against 
unlimited authority of a coercive sovereign power.1 I 
9 F.Hayek, "Liberal Bir Sosyal Diizenin ilkeleri," Sosyal ve Siyasal Teori (Ankara: Siyasal 
Kitapevi, 1993), 123-124. 
10 G.Ruggiero, European Liberalism, 159-60. 
11 John Gray, Liberalism (Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1989), 74-75. 
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of authority, but under a constitutional form of government, governors are 
also subject to law and thus equality is not completely violated.14 
Constitutionality requires to think on contradictory matters not only as 
questions of policy but as question of individuals' established rights and the 
governments' limited duties. 15 Constitutionality came with the adoption of 
some liberal principles such as preventing arbitrary use of power, equality 
under the law, and the individual as a unit of analysis. 
In the Ottoman case, constitutionalism, it seems, was one of the most long-
standing demand of liberals. Many of them perceived liberalism as 
constitutionality and the core of their demand from the center was 
proclamation of a ~onstitution which recognized people's rights and the limits 
of the sultan's power. 
TENETS OF LIBERALISM 
In spite of the wide ranging definitions of liberalism, there are some 
indispensable tenets associated with it and which clarify its boundaries. Those 
are: individualism, liberty, equality, tolerance, market economy, and the 
notion of liberal state. 
1) INDIVIDUALISM 
Individualism is an indispensable part of liberalism. "It is the metaphysical 
and ontological core of liberal thought and the basis of moral, economic and 
14 Harry Girvetz, The Evolution of Liberalism (New York: Collier Books, 1950), 105. 
15 Leslie Dunbar, Reclaiming Liberalism (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 1991), 34. 
7 
cultural existence. The individual is both more real than and pnor to 
society." 16 
Classical liberal understanding characterizes the individual as a single, self-
enclosed being. The individual is bound up with its own subjectivity. Body 
determines the limits of individuality. Natural rights assumed that the 
individual is the owner of his or her body. This means that the individual is 
the possessor of its own being and society has no right over individual. 
Legal guarantee of individualism stemmed from the priority of private sphere 
over public sphere. The safeguard of private sphere strenghtened by political 
guarantees that protect the individual against the sovereign whether it is the 
monarch or the people. 17 
Without creating a sphere in which individuality can be practiced, it is not 
possible to conceive liberal individuals or liberal understanding of 
individuality~ As Hallowel claims, liberalism not only required the existence 
of the concept of an autonomous individual but also an environment 
compatible to the exercise of individual autonomy. Without a suitable 
environment the values posited by liberalism would not be meaningful. These 
values· could be expressed and articulated in everyday life. 18 
An individual was perceived not only as an equal among other individuals, 
but also as having reason and thus having the ability to restrain his or her 
passions and emotions by means of realizing the potential of a rational 
universal order. Individuality denotes several things such as inherent moral 
worth and spiritual equality of all individuals, dignity of human personality, 
16 Vincent, Ideologies, 32. 
17 Ruggiero, Eurepean Liberalism, 161. 
18 Hallowel, The Decline, 3. 
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independence of human will, and the basic rationality of men. Rationality 
attributed creativeness to the individual and broadened the domain of action. 19 
It can be said that medieval men were defined on the basis of a universal 
divine order. On the other hand, modem man is defined on the basis of 
individuality. 
2)FREEDOM 
The eminent value of liberalism is freedom. Some other liberal values are 
derived from freedom. For example, constitutionalism aims to protect 
individual freedom. It is commonly agreed that freedom is not a means to a 
higher political end. It is itself the highest political end. 
Freedom as a liberal freedom denotes a situation in which individuals are not 
coerced or restrained. In this situation the main source of coercion is the state, 
whose intervention undermines individual initiative and diminishes essential 
freedom. Thus a right understanding of freedom in a liberal political 
environment can be defined in terms of lack of coercion, intervention, 
pressure, and restraint. Therefore, freedom is the absence of external 
impediments. 20 Such kind of freedom can be provided only by an impersonal 
authority, because freedom requires absence of arbitrary and personal rule that 
can be exercised over individual. 
Liberal freedom is defined on the basis of individuality. Individuals as moral 
entities should have the freedom to develop their potentialities. Since 
19 Ibid., 4-5 
20 Arblaster, Western Liberalism, 56. 
9 
arbitrariness is incompatible with freedom, any subordination to another 
individual's will and arbitrary authority is contradictory with the idea of 
autonomous individual. This freedom,however, is not unlimited and requires 
responsibility on the part of the individual. Recognition of some common 
authority is necessary for providing freedom to all individuals. But this 
authority is postulated to be impersonal, non-arbitrary and objective. Only by 
the agreement of an impersonal, rational, and objective authority can all 
individuals reach and practice freedom in society. 
Liberalism can be identified with various struggles to protect from attack by 
arbitrary governments and expand various aspects of individual freedom.21 
3) LIBERAL STATE 
. 
Liberals have a dilemma with regard to the role of the state and realization of 
freedom. First, liberal understanding of freedom necessitates the non-
intervention of the state, but freedom is also defined in terms of protecting the 
individual from another individual's intervention. State can be employed to 
safeguard an individual from another's interference but that would lead to a 
situation whereby state intervention, widely perceived as the main source of 
coercion, would be legitimized. Liberals accept a state which is a protector, 
but the limits of its protection and activity are determined by laws. In other 
words, the constitutionalist tradition has been deeply influenced by the liberal 
understanding of the state which determines the limits of state authority and 
intervention. 
21 Richard Bellamy, Victorian Liberalism: J9'h Century Politic~/ Thought and Practice (London: 
Routledge, 1990), 2. 
10 
Since the early days there has been a close relation between liberalism and 
constitutionalism. At first the nature of the relationship was not so explicit. 
Later liberalism was equated with constitutionalism, because both seek a 
limited and legitimate state. If there were no limitations to state authority 
there could be no freedom in society, which meant that both liberalism and 
constitutionalism sought to place definite limits on state authority. 
Liberal understanding of the state signifies a protected sphere of non-
interference on the rule of law. 22 The aim of every political institution is a 
limited state including state itself is the preservation of the natural and 
inalienable rights of man.23 The tacit contract between individuals and the 
liberal state defines the rights and duties of the individual as well as the state . 
. 
Individuals obey the state during the state guaranteed their rights. 
The functions of the state can be summarized as follows: 
1) enforcement of contracts, 
2) preservation of order, 
3) promotion of exchange, 
4) protection of freedom and competition.24 
Liberals claimed that some state intervention and regulation was necessary 
both for protecting the market from attempts to undermine it and to cure its 
deficiencies in providing certain public goods.25 
22 Gray, Liberalism, 2. 
23 Bobbio, Democracy, 2. 
24 Girvetz, Evolution, 96-102. 
25 Richard Bellamy, Liberalism and Modern Society (Pennsylvania State University Press, 1992), 4. 
11 
4)EQUALITY 
Formal understanding of equality is promoted in liberalism. Inequality is 
perceived as the outcome of natural fact or impersonal processes. But equality 
is inevitable in terms of legal foundation of the state. Equality is closely 
related to the exercise freedom in society and perceived as the rational end of 
constitutionality. Another important aspect is economic equality which 
denotes equal access to the market. Individuals have equal rights to seek their 
interests in the market. Liberals accepted equality which is provided by the 
state as a false equality. State should not try to equate individuals but only 
guard their equality in respect to equal access to market opportunities. 
GERMAN LIBERALISM: A Case in Point 
a) German Understanding of State and Freedom 
For many English-speaking intellectuals German liberalism seems to be first 
cousins with their own version, because both political cultures are sufficiently 
similar and yet distinctive enough to yield meaningful conclusions about the 
viability of their own. 26 
26 Konrad H. Jaraush and Larry E. Jones, In Search of a Liberal Germany: Studies in the History of 
German Liberalism from 1789 to the Present (New York: Berg Publishers, 1990), 1. 
12 
The source of the German problem is the inability of German liberals to 
transform state and society in accordance with the Anglo-American standards 
of equality and freedom. German idea of freedom is used for the shortcomings 
of German Liberalism. In the German idea for freedom and equality, strong 
government is necessary.27 
Immanuel Kant is the representative figure of German liberalism. The various 
antinomies that characterize Kantian philosophy constitute dilemmas of 
German liberalism. Kant's philosophy simultaneously encompasses, for 
instance, the separation of ethics from politics, and, at the same time, placing 
of politics on ethical foundations; advocacy of republicanism and the doctrine 
of universal consent; the rejection of democracy and right to resist an unjust 
monarch. Similarly, an emphasis on liberty and equality of all individuals, and 
. 
insistence on a superior authority for social progress, go hand in hand.28 
German political freedom was founded upon older national assumptions in 
which the idea of liberty was not a polar antithesis of princely authority but a 
historical associate of it.29Max Weber, too, saw democracy and freedom as 
only means for the promotion of Germany's liberal economic and political 
ends. 
From the reformation to the revolutionary era of the nineteenth century, basic 
forms of modem libertarian understanding influenced, but did not alter, the 
German approach to liberty, a tradition rooted in medieval time with respect 
to both political action and thought. This tradition was influenced by 
27 James Sheehan, German Liberalism in the J9h Century,(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), 5. 
28 Bellamy, Modern, 160. 
29 Leonard Krieger, The German Idea Of Freedom (Boston: Beacon Press, 1957), 5. 
13 
Lutheranism but not preeminently. The concept of Libertaet, rather than 
German religiosity, was the source German attitude toward freedom. The term 
Libertaet referred to the interconnections between the rights of the princes to 
govern and the rights of people to be represented. 30 This was the first link 
established which associated freedom with the authority of the state. 
In nineteenth- century Europe, respect for the rights of the individual in public 
institutions was the main achievement. These rights can be listed as follows: 
1) freedom of belief, which is right to hold and communicate one's individual 
beliefs and opinions; 2) material liberties, which include right of free 
economic initiative and exchange, social mobility, and juridical security; and 
3) broad distribution of political powers which facilitate control of public 
institutions. Those rights were organized in a constitutional system, one of the 
basic tenets of classical liberalism, which guaranteed their freedom. In 
Eastern Europe and colonial areas, this constitutional system was associated 
with emancipation from traditional ties of caste and despotism. 
In spite of unintegrated and incomplete process, German institutions were 
affected by this liberal spirit and influenced national life. Spiritual and 
material liberties were never organized into a single system of rights. The 
authoritarian structure of German states and society reinforced its traditional 
claim of freedom while it remained outside the liberal movement but being 
continuously influenced by it. The problem of freedom continued to affect 
German thought deeply. Under the influence of other European developments, 
German liberalism took the form of a peculiar constitutionalism which, 
30 Ibid., 6. 
14 
consequently, became a half-finished structure and crumbled under the strain 
of later social and international conflicts.31 
German idea of freedom cannot be understood without a clear understanding 
of the notion of the state in that context. From the beginning, liberal attitude 
toward the state was a problematical one. The liberals saw the state as the 
defender of the status quo and an instrument of repression on the one hand, 
and an ally against opponents, a source of progressive change, on the other. 
Officials who were influential in the liberal sphere can be particularly counted 
as being the reason for this problematic attitude toward state. Their demands 
in many ways coincided with that of progressive Germans: administrative 
efficiency, legal equality, and material prosperity. These officials tried to 
build enlightened opinions. Later, when their influence decreased, their 
demands did not disappear, but drastically changed form. 
Until the French conquest of Central Europe those officials were timid in 
respect to their princely superiors, but later liberal officials seemed to be the 
most effective instruments of change and cohesion. Even, the extension of 
bureaucracy,was perceived as the only way of survival. By the increasing 
power· of bureaucracy increased, aristocratic power declined. Bureaucracy 
started to control local authorities and used centralization of power . as a 
substantial means to exercise influence on social, economic, and cultural life 
in towns. Those restrictions imposed by bureaucracy on the cultural, political, 
and economic domain became a very important impetus for liberal movement. 
Liberals started to complain about unwarranted limitations on the freedom, 
31 Ibid., 3-4, 275. 
15 
enlightenment, and progress. Liberalism even functioned as an umbrella for 
the antipathy people felt toward the central bureaucracy. 32 In spite of the 
liberals'reaction against the power of bureaucracy, it cannot be said that the 
liberal movement was based on their will to push back the power and 
influence of the state for the sake of liberty of the individuals. Liberals did not 
reject the importance of the state in shaping fundamental social, economic, 
and political institutions, but they strongly opposed the abuse of state power. 
Their problem was to reconcile their recognition of state power as a necessary 
means for reaching their ideals with their hatred of official despotism. 
This ambivalence and complexity can be seen in many liberal writings. They 
opposed bureaucracy, but they were reluctant not to see state as a guardian of 
law and order. One of them, Theodor Welcker, perceived the state as having a 
. 
positive moral function without which it would be like a legal marriage 
without love.33 
Liberals were disturbed by the equation of hatred to bureaucracy with the 
state. Mahl proposed to overcome this mistake by means of greater popular 
participation in the political process and employing better qualified officials 
in the bureaucracy rather trying to dismantle it. He also emphasized positive 
accomplishments of the state. 
Within the liberal domain, only a minority was willing to limit state actions 
and oppose the state. Liberals believed that in spite of abuses, the state was 
the most important actor of progress. Liberals relied on state leadership in 
32 Sheehan, German Liberalism, 39 
33 Ibid., 40. 
16 
some key areas. Education was one of them. Liberals believed that education 
was necessary just as money, army, and roads were. Therefore, German 
liberals viewed increased state power to give birth to an expanded school 
system. Liberals claimed that state support, encouragement and even control, 
were necessary for having such a school system. They believed that the state 
should replace the church in matters of education since the state could be the 
• 
only tolerant actor in the educational domain.State power was needed for the 
seculaRtzation of society in schools. If there was a conflict between the state 
and another institution such as the church, the state should always have the 
final say. For liberals, "it is the state which joins the individual to universal 
good and the divine order34 
Another sphere i~ which state power was emphasized was the economy. 
"German liberalism itself departed very early from the principle of laissez-
faire when it became apparent that free market would create many intractable 
social problems.3511 German liberalism, from the beginning, sought 
collaboration with the state. Both theorists and businessmen wished to make 
the state a partner in their quest for social progress and personal enrichment.36 
Necessity for state action in the economic domain was put forward by 
Friedrich List. He focused on the backwardness of German economy and, to 
prevent the inhibition of German economy by more developed nations he 
said, state intervention was necessary in spite of some unfortunate results it 
might bring. As a result of this intervention, Germany circumvented the 
entrepreneurial stage of capitalism and hence failed to produce the 
characteristic liberal social infrastructure, based on a decentralized market 
34 Ibid., 41. 
35 Reinhard Bendix, Kings or Prople (Berkeley: University of California Press,1978), 422 
36 Sheehan, German Liberalism, 42. 
17 
economy involving competition between privately-owned medium-sized 
firms. Instead, German economy was characterized by large-scale units in the 
hands of a small group of powerful industrialists who strongly supported by 
the state. " Comparing the statistics of joint-stock companies in 1910, Ralf 
Dahrendorf noted that in Germany there were 5,000 such companies with a 
capital of approximately 16 billion Marks, whereas in Britain they numbered 
about 50,000 with a total capital of 44 billion Marks."37 German liberals were 
not disturbed by this situation. Many German businessmen including those 
who were active in large-scale capital-intensive sectors, encouraged state 
involvement in industry: they demanded protection and even state subvention 
in these sectors. They believed that only a powerful state could provide the 
basis for economic development. Thus, the state played a prominent role in 
the rapid growth of large-scale industrial development of Germany. State not 
only supported the entrepreneurs also owned a large number of industrial 
concerns. "Finally the state further distorted the nature of German capitalism 
by actively facilitating the formation of monopolies and cartels of big 
industrialists. "3& 
During the process of national unification, German liberals' idea of the state 
can be seen in a clear way. State was perceived as the only actor which could 
facilitate the unification by providing order. In practice, the state· also 
destroyed regional institutions and weakened local ties. They preferred a 
constitutional state instead of personal freedom as a leading factor of unity. 
Liberals believed that after unification, no power would be able to stop the 
progressive dissemination of liberal ideas and institutions. Liberalism and 
37 Bellamy, Modern, 158. 
38 Ibid., 159. 
18 
national unity were two sides of the same coin; in both spheres the state was 
the leading force. For them, a national state could unite agrarian and industrial 
interests. German liberals did not perceive their support of nationalism as 
giving up values of liberalism for nationalism, but they saw liberal values as 
closely related to the creation of a strong Germany in the international system. 
The dilemma of liberals was that they wanted a strong and unified state 
which could represent Germany in the international system in a vigorous way. 
But the strength of the state in the international system limited liberals to 
influence the "ally state". 
Up to now an attempt was made to explain the German idea of freedom and 
German idea of state. Both of these ideas are interconnected and very 
important to understand the peculiar feature of German liberalism. In spite of 
. 
a problematic understanding, the state is potent force in the German sphere of 
ideas. In this respect, German and Ottoman liberalism have the very deep 
similarity. "The idea that the state is omnipotent was deeply entrenched in 
Ottoman society and culture and this enabled the state to intervene in every 
conceivable field of activity. "39 In the Ottoman case, there were prominent 
intellectuals who struggled for a kind liberalism not opposed to the power of 
the state or of the Sultan' but only wanted to restrict their power and to 
control semi-aristocratic, semi-bureaucratic groups. Mizanc1 Murat was one 
of the first Ottoman intellectuals who analyzed centralized state power as a 
source of illiberalism: "obstacle for liberalism is the illness of eastern type of 
over centralization. Everything has an official color: science, literature, and 
39 Feroz Ahmad, Ittihatciliktan Kemalizme (lstanbul: Kaynak Y aymlan, 1986), 34. 
19 
art. The combination of intellectual power and political power was the source 
of malady. 1140 
Also, as in the case of German liberalism Ottoman intellectuals gave 
importance to education to overcome some illiberal maladies such as strong 
state and weak individuals41 • But this education was also state supported and 
encouraged. Yusuf Ak~ura criticized the Tanzimat bureaucrats who 
emphasized the state instead of the people. In the economic domain under the 
influence of German national economy, the state tried to create a bourgeoisie. 
This endeavor not only limited to state loans but in some areas state itself 
acted as an entrepreneur. As Zafer Toprak claimed, this aim succeeded in the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century. The number of companies in Ottoman 
Empire increased sharply. As in the case of Germany, Ottoman bourgeoisie 
. 
was under the umbrella of the state; they demanded state intervention in many 
areas and this did not disturb them because they believed that they would fail 
without the help of the state. In such a weak position, they could not seek 
freedom from the state. Bourgeoisie in the German and Ottoman cases was 
too "unpolitical" to struggle for freedom and development ofliberalism. 
b )THE RECHTSST AA T: German Understanding of Constitutionalism 
It has been the state which created the foundations for citizenship by 
weakening the restraints imposed by traditional society, lessening the effects 
of regional loyalties on institutions and creating laws which linked the 
40 ~erif Mardin, Jon Turkler'in Siyasi Fikirleri (istanbul:ileti~im Yaymlar1, 1992) 
41 ~erif Mardin, The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1960), 
407 
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individual to central state.42 The main problem of liberalism was to find a way 
to reconcile achievements of The state and to fulfill the requirements of 
citizenship.At this point, the Rechtsstaat (literally, "law- state") became the 
German peculiar alternative to the rule of law. The The Rechtsstaat was the 
embodiment of constitutional government, which placed restraints upon the 
authority of the state and limited its arbitrary will. Also those limitations were 
recognized by the state, but not a weak government.A Rechtsstaat tried to 
reconcile new liberties with old authority. The Rechtsstaat was regarded as 
the first step to make the state powerful and rational at the same time to 
recognize individual freedoms.The Rechtsstaat denotes four things: 1) a 
constitutional arrangement capable of providing security and endowing a legal 
system with regularity; 2) the enshrinment of subjective public rights in 
positive law;3) ?epersonalization of law; and 4) most importantly, 
identification of law as a norm binding both the ruler and the ruled.43The 
Rechtsstaat was formulated to weaken the parochial customs of traditional 
society and to stand against the arbitrary power of rulers. The Rechtsstaat 
reflected a German synthesis of freedom in society and respect for the 
authority of the state. As Krieger suggested, Rechtsstaat was an attempt to 
rationalize the combination of individualism with traditionalism in state 
strucnire. It tried to reconcile sovereign concentration of political power with 
liberal policy.For Karl Welcker the Rechtsstaat is the mixture of traditional 
authority and recognition of undeniable claims of individual rights for. 
Welcker proposed that the rights and liberties of individuals and traditional 
control of state over individuals were equally valid. State control in such areas 
as education, religion, and culture should not be radically eroded. The 
42 Sheehan, German Liberalism, 43. 
43 Merquir, Old and New, 85. 
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Rechtsstaat should so function as to administer those changed substance of 
individual and sovereign claims but not to function so as to exclude some 
important areas from scope of the state.44 
The Rechtsstaat was meant to function in a way to promote individual 
freedom and the state was expected to provide institutions to enable 
individuals to exercise these freedoms. The state could exercise power to 
allow individuals to practice their freedom and to allow their representation 
in the governing domain. A Rechtsstaat necessitated a constitution that 
allowed individual participation. Mohl, as a defender of the Rechtsstaat, 
declared that "the governing power of the state was absolute and 
unconditional but in actual practice the ruler required support, so the 
participation of people could be permitted. He believed that individual rights 
. 
put an intolerable limit upon the state power.45 So the Rechtsstaat was the 
new formula of state understanding which merged indivisibility of state 
power, and strong role of ruler, with the inviolable rights of citizens. 
The Rechtsstaat postulated that, for the achievement of individual freedom in 
society, a strong and independent authority was necessary. The integration of 
individual freedom into the order of existing states was provided by the 
Rechtsstaat. Strong political authority could operate under constitutional 
conditions in which personal and civil rights became an end product. 
In spite of these deficiencies, Hallowel suggested that the Rechtsstaat was in 
essence liberal and related to two tenets of liberalism: individual rights and 
44 Krieger, Freedom, 255. 
45 Ibid., 257. 
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constitutional state. Two essential principles of liberalism, rational and 
politically autonomous individual, and eternal truths found in a natural order, 
were sacred in the German Rechtsstaat. Rechtsstaat assumed men were free 
from all authority except the authority of law.It provided equality before the 
law, and protection from arbitrariness and injustice. The authority of law was 
totally impersonal and independent of personal will; law and justice were 
perceived as identical. Providing maximum possible freedom to each 
individual and abolishing all restraints except law were the ideals of the 
Rechtsstaat. The attainment of maximum possible freedom both from the 
state and from other individuals was the aim.46 Traditional authority of the 
state could only be justified by providing individual freedoms. The 
Rechtsstaat would ensure the freedom of its citizens and remove all obstacles 
in the way of practising one's freedom, yet the Rechtsstaat was not seen as an 
institution which only enforced law over transgressor. Liberals believed that 
the constitution should restrain the arbitrary power of ruler but not weaken the 
power of government. 
At the extreme side, some liberals such as Rudolf Gneist rejected that society 
had any essential role in the sovereignty of the state. Political parties and 
ideals ·of western constitutionalism were seen as destructive expressions of 
society. The state was regarded as being completely independent of society 
and viewed as being above society. In constitutionalism they saw middle-class 
ambition to dominate the state and condemned it as being thoroughly inimical 
to the Rechtsstaat. The Rechtsstaat as an indicator of the nineteenth-century 
liberalism is not defined in terms of a state which permitted individual rights 
apart from the state but, in terms of a state which articulated its power from 
46 Hallowel, The Decline, 40-42. 
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legal modes of action. All rights permitted by the state could be used in 
preserving this nature of the state. They believed that "society could find the 
personal freedom, moral and spiritual development of individual, only by 
permanent subordination to a constant higher power. "47 They tried to resolve 
the problem of constitutionalism within the boundaries of existing order. So, 
Rechtsstaat appeared in two diametrically opposite ways: as a conservative 
form of polity as well as political system open to liberalization. 
Another deficiency of German liberalism was its preference of the state over 
people. Preference for the state continued for a long time. This understanding 
facilitated the liberals' cooperation with Bismarck, who sought a strong and 
centralized state. After the rise of social democrats, liberals started to think 
that liberalism should be based on the people. But they did not wholly reject 
the idea that people could be fluctuating, chaotic, volatile, and unstable but 
the state was always decisive. German liberals were reluctant to give 
preference to people over the state. This dilemma was seen also in the 
parliament-monarch dichotomy. In sum, deference to authority and anxiety 
about disorder, the pull of the state and fear of people, are important features 
of German liberalism. 
Similar statements are equally valid for the Ottoman case. In the. first 
Constitution of the Ottoman Empire there was an endeavor to reconcile the 
Sultan with his subjects on the basis of the constitution. The 1876 
Constitution institutionalized the absolute royal prerogative: the Sultan could 
dissolve the parliament.After 1908 revolution, some liberal conception of 
fundamental human rights were agreed. There are many common aspects of 
47 Krieger, Freedom, 460. 
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Ottoman and German liberalism but it seems that the most significant was 
that of inevitability of strong center/state. 
25 
CHAPTER II 
1876 CONSTITUION: THE FIRST OTTOMAN LIBERAL GAINS 
After 1875, Mid.hat Pru;a worked on a draft constitution. His main aim was to 
contest the power of the Sultan. When Sultan Murat acceeded to throne, the 
constitutional issue started to be discussed intensively in the newspapers. These 
discussions helped the formation of a group which supported Midhat Pa~a's 
constitutional ideas. They also proposed the formation of an assembly which 
would consist of all ethnic and religious groups in the Ottoman Empire. The 
Meclis-i Umumi ~et on July 15. They accepted Midhat Pa~a's constitutional 
proposal in principle. 48 
The idea of constitutionalism also was discussed publicly. Nam1k Kemal wrote 
in lttihad a series of articles supporting constitutionalism. He believed, as did 
many others, that constitution and parliament were in conformity with Islam. 49 
Later,ln1876, Esad Efendi, a teacher at the Kuleli Military School, wrote a 
pamphlet in the form of dialogue: Hiikiimet-i Me~ruta (Constitutional 
Government). Esad Efendi's main thesis focused on the necessity of a 
mechanism for controlling the executive power. That even if Sultans were just 
and clever, there would be a corrupt group around them which needed be 
controlled against their arbitrariness. In absolutist regimes there was no 
48 Roderick H. Davison, Reform in the Ottoman Empire 1856-1876 (New York: Gordion Press, 1973). 
360-361. 
49 ~erif Mardin, Turkiye'de Din ve Siyaset, 279; Mardin, Tfirk Modrenl~mesi, 89-90. 
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controlling mechanism over executive power. This paved the way for 
corruption and decay. On the other hand, the constitution facilitated the control 
of the executive. This controlling function was practiced by representative 
assemblies. 
In this pamphlet Esat Efendi posed some important questions ·as if they were 
asked by an ordinary person, such as:"What is the constitutional regime?" His 
answer to that particular question was, "All the business of government accrued 
within the boundaries of Constitution". so 
To restrain the arbitrariness an elected body was necessary, and an assembly 
would fulfill that function. The assembly would check all the operations of 
government to ensµre that its actions were in conformity with the constitution. 
However, there was a problem related to the assembly: whether non-Muslims 
would be represented in this assembly as equals or not. According to Esad 
Efendi the duty of the assembly was not to prepare solutions related to Islam, 
but to deal with the actual problems of state. Representatives, whether Muslims 
or non-Muslims, could monitor the actions of the executive in the name of the 
people. It would ensure that the government did not abuse its executive power 
and set in an unconstitutional way.51 Esad Efendi, moreover, argued that the 
idea of a constitution was in conformity with Islam, and that, essentially, an 
Islamic government was a constitutional one. The necessity of a constitution 
and an assembly was dictated by the need for mechanism to ensure that 
constitutional government did no degenarate into absolutism52• 
so Tank Zafer Tunaya, "Ilk Osmanh Anayasa Kitab1; HUkUmet-i Me~ruta" in Tanzimattan Cumhuriyete 
TUrkiye Ansiklopedisi. 
si Davison, Reforms, 366-367, Tunaya, 34-35. 
s2 Bernard Lewis, Modern Turkiye'nin Dogu<$u (Ankara: TUrk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlar1, 1993), 171-172 
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Midhat P~a and other liberals agreed upon the necessity of placing limits on 
the Sultan's power, and that this limitation would be the first essential step 
before even thinking what shape the new regime would take. A written 
constitution, they thought, would be a useful device to limit the power of 
Sultan. 
On the basis of this constitution, first, ministers, being responsible to the 
assembly, would be able to check the power of Sultan. Secondly, the assembly 
would include all Ottoman subjects on the basis of equality, regardless of 
religion. Thirdly, to strengthen the control of provincial administration over 
governors, decentralization would be adopted. 53 Those were the aims of 
Midhad P~a when he bargained with Abdi.ilhamid before his accession to the 
. 
throne. As mentioned in Mahmud Celaleddin Pa~a's Mirat-1 Hakikat, 
Abdi.ilhamid declared that he would not accept any government which was not 
bounded by constitution and consultation. He made his point so persuasively 
that Midhad P~a had no doubt about the liberal sentiments of Sultan. 54 
The Sultan accepted that in essence Muslim government was constitutional, 
and that an assembly was necessary to control the administration and deter it 
from turning into an autocracy. A constitution was a guarantee against 
deviations of the administration from principles of Islamic government. 55 Esad 
Efendi stipulated that the admission of Christians to parliamentary and military 
53 Devereux, First Ottoman Constitutional Period (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1963), 30-31 
s4 Devereux, Constitutional, 42-43. 
ss Niyazi Berkes, Turkiye'de <;:agda~la§ma (Istanbul: Dogu-Bat1 Yaymlan),342. Biat and mesveret were 
basic concepts for them. Biat was interpreted as obedience by free will which necessitated reciprocal right 
and duties; mesveret was interpreted as the necessity of consultation which delineate of the powers of the 
sultan. 
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service reflected the actual conditions of the Empire, and believed that a 
constitution was the best guarantee against the use of arbitrary power56 and a 
means for providing equality.Similar ideas had also been proposed by Mustafa 
Resid Pa~a. 57 After Abdiilhamid became Sultan, he promised the promulgation 
of the constitution.58 On 30 September 1876, Abdo.lhamid published an irade 
(imperial decree) which declared the necessity of forming a Constitutional 
Commission to prepare a draft constitution. This Commission included 
members of the ulema and civil officials. The Meclis-i Umumi held a meeting 
on 2 October, and strengthened the decision related to the establishment of a 
constitution. Approximately one hundred and twenty members attended the 
meeting. 
The Constitutional Committee had twenty eight members. Its first session was 
held on 6 October, nearly all the members of the Committee consisted of ulema 
and civil officials: sixteen civil officials and ten ulema. The other two members 
were from the military. The Committee consisted of both Muslims and 
Christians. Among the Christians, Odion Efendi, who was one of the authors of 
the Armenian Millet's Constitution, was very influential. Other influential 
Christians were Alexander Karatheodari, undersecretary for foreign affairs, and 
V ahan:, undersecretary for justice. There were also some outstanding 
proponents of a constitutional regime such as Midhat Pa~a, Ziya Pa~a, Nam1k 
Kemal, Server Pa~a, Seyfeddin P~a. Midhat Pa~a was held in high esteem 
among Europeans and his Grand Vizirate who thought to guarantee the 
adoption and continuity of a constitutional regime.59 
56 Abdurrahman ~eref, Tarih Sohbetleri (1stanbul: Sucuoglu Matbaas1, 1980), 160-161. 
57 ~erifMardin, Tiirkiye'de Top/um ve Siyaset, 292-298. 
58 ilber Ortayh, imparatorlgun En Uzun Yiizyzli (istanbul,Hil,1995), 209-210. 
59 Davison, Reforms. 368-369; Devereux, Constitutional. 48. 
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Several drafts were submitted to Sultan Abdiilhamid, but not a single one was 
adopted. The final text was drawn from several drafts. Members' suggestions 
were influential in the shaping of the constitution. Many existing constitutions 
and interpretations about them were rewieved as part of the preparations, but 
one of the most important sources was Midhat Pa~a's draft in which the Council 
of Ministers was given more power and became influential in internal and 
external affairs. The office of the grand vizier was abolished; instead a 
European-type prime ministry was founded. Also all Ottoman subjects, without 
any distinction on the basis of creed and ethnicity, were perceived as equals. 
Freedom of speech and press were guaranteed. Inviolability of domicile and 
property were promised. In addition, all people were given the freedom to use 
their native language. 60 
The equality principle between all creeds and the allowance for Christians to be 
members of parliament created a powerful opposition outside the Commission. 
This opposition was suppressed in a short time by exiling outstanding members 
of this directing group. 
The draft constitution was completed and submitted to Sultan Abdi.ilhamid. It 
included 140 articles. Commission members hoped that the Constitution .would 
be promulgated in a short time. However, a new opposition emerged from 
Abdi.ilhamid and among some Palace officials. Palace officials feared that they 
would lose their influence, and Abdi.ilhamid had the fear of losing his imperial 
prerogatives. Opposition claimed that the articles related to sovereign power 
60 T. Z. Tunaya, "Midhat Pa~a'mn Anayasac1hk Anlay1~1," In, Uluslararas1 Midhat Pa~a Semineri 
(Ankara: Tilrk Tarih Kurumu Yaymlan,1986), 41-42 
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should be eliminated because they restricted the imperial will. 
Constitutionalists believed that Abdi.ilhamid was not sincere about the 
constitution and tried to enhance the imperial prerogatives. 
Abdiilhamid did not reject the draft constitution, but demanded the revision of 
articles related to imperial prerogatives in the Council of Ministers, and also 
wanted to create a harmony between constitution and people's customs and 
needs. He explained that "We have noted in it passages incompatible with the 
habits and aptitudes of the country". 61 After this revision many further 
amendments and excisions were made in the draft constitution. On December 
7, the draft was officially submitted to the Sultan. This time the number of 
articles had decreased to 112, but the Palace declared that an additional act was 
necessary. An additional article, Article 113, was introduced giving authority to 
. 
the Sultan to exile persons who posed a threat to the state. The Sultan insisted 
that he would not agree to the constitution without this additional article. 
However, constitutionalists claimed such an article was contrary to the spirit of 
the constitution and that its adoption would vitiate the constitution. At the end, 
the Sultan approved the Constitution on 23 December. 
After the promulgation the Sultan published a hatt-i humayun (imperial edict) 
in which it was claimed that the Constitution was compatible with the .sacred 
law and the reformist line of development. The Constitution was described as 
being beneficial to all Ottoman subjects, who would enjoy liberty and equality 
without distinction on the basis of creed and the same rights and privileges 
would be accorded to all subjects of the Empire. It would, moreover, safeguard 
people from the arbitrary power of the government and protect government 
61Devereux, Constitution, 54. 
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from arbitrary domination by one or more persons, since it rendered abuses of 
power illegal. 62 Midhat Pa§a, after the promulgation of Constitution, went to 
the Armenian and Greek patriarchs and guaranteed them that the Constitution 
would create a sphere in which all creeds were treated as equals. The 
Constitution was perceived as a guarantee to check the administration and 
providing free expression and more freedom. Therefore, people accepted the 
Constitution. 
Davison claimed that the 1876 Constitution could be described as "limited 
monarchy", because the Sultan's power was not denied; to the contrary, the 
Sultan retained substantial powers as indicated in Article 7: 
Among the sovereign rights of his Majesty the Sultan are the following 
prerogatives: he makes and cancels the appointment of ministries; he 
confers the grades, functions and insignia of his orders and confers 
investiture on the chief of the privileged provinces according to forms 
determined by the privileges granted to them; he has the coining of money; 
his name is pronounced in the mosques during public prayer; he concludes 
treaties with the powers; he declares war and makes peace; he commands 
both the ground and naval forces ; he directs military movements; he 
carries out the provisions of the Sharia and of the other laws; he sees to the 
administration of public measures; he respites or commutes sentences 
pronounced by the criminal courts; he summons and prorogues the General 
Assembly; he dissolves ifhe deems it necessary, the Chamber of Deputies, 
provided he directs the election of new members. 
Sovereignty thus still belonged to the Sultan, who retained influential P.OWers; 
ministers were responsible not to the Chamber of Deputies but to the Sultan. 
However, this kind of responsibility was not peculiar to the Ottoman case; the 
same existed in the 1871 German Constitution.63 
62Roderic Davison, Reforms, 382; Devereux, Constitutional, 82. 
63 ~erifMardin, The Genesis, 281; Devereux, Constitutional, 64-65. 
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Devereux also claimed that the promulgation of the 1876 Ottoman 
Constitution was as important as "The Declaration of Independence in 
America", because at least in a formal way there was a transition from 
"despotic autocracy to constitutional monarchy", and for the first time Sultan 
became less absolute and participation of people in the government was assured 
along with their basic liberties.64 The Sultan's will was necessary for the 
operation of a bill to become a law. 
On the other hand, the Constitution was also a bill of rights for the Ottoman 
people65• It necessitated the existence of an independent judiciary and the 
budget was opened to scrutiny by the parliament: 
The Constitution provided clearly for security of judicial tenure, public 
trial and no administrative interference with the courts. The individual 
rights and civil liberties of Ottoman subjects were generally well stated -
individual liberty and freedom from arbitrary punishment, freedom of 
religion and of privileges accorded the millets, freedom of the press within 
the limits of the law, freedom of commercial association, the right of 
petition, security of property and domicile taxation according to law and 
individuals means. 66 
These principles were put forth in such an explicit manner for the first time in 
Ottoman history. 
The adaption of these principles may have stemmed in part from European 
criticism, but it is also a fact that an increasing number of Ottoman statesman 
perceived equality among all peoples as a means for maintaining coherence of 
64 Devereux, Constitutional, 15. 
65 Bernard Lewis, Modern Turkiye, 172. 
66 Davison, Reforms, 381. 
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a heterogeneous empire. This declared equality was reaffirmed when the 
Constitution repromulgated in 1908. 67 
The introduction of declaration of equality was important because, as Davison 
claimed, since the eighteenth-century American Bill of Rights stating that "all 
men are created equal," and the French declaration of the rights of citizens, all 
modem societies had to find a way to solve problems stemming from 
inequality. Social groups constituting the citizenry of many states had different 
linguistic, racial, ethnic, political, or religious identities. In Ottoman society, 
the main source of this inequality was religious. Consequently the articles of 
the Constitution which aimed to create a sphere in which all Ottomans were 
treated equally can be seen as a turning point. Equality was perceived as an 
official policy in the nineteenth century and was explicitly stated in the 1876 
Constitution. Mahmud 11(1809-1839) pioneered this equality by affirming that 
all of his subjects were equal. Equal treatment required legal and regulatory 
adjustments and reforms in a wide range of fields, including administration of 
justice, military service, taxation according to means, educational opportunity 
and occupation of governmental posts as well as forbidding every form of 
discrimination aiming to create inferiority of one group to another on the basis 
of religion, language, or race68• For officials, this egalitarian notion of 
citizenship was necessary for the integrity and indissolubility of the Empire. 
Many concepts and principles introduced in the 1876 Constitution had their 
origins in the Tanzimat era. However, explanation of these principles in a 
solemn manner within a Western-type written Constitution was the distinctive 
67 Davison, "Political Modernization," 85-86. 
68 Mehmet Seyitdanhoglu, "Tiirkiye'de Liberal Oii§Uncenin Dogu§U ve Geli§imi." Liberal 
Durance (Bahar 1996), 106. 
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feature of the 1876 Constitution.In this Constitution people were not perceived 
as being within the boundaries of a religious community. Until that time, the 
civil status of subjects was defined on that basis but now people came to be 
perceived as citizens of the state. Realization of this principle was not so easy 
because it necessitated the breakdown of the traditional millet system. In time, 
this principle came to be firmly entrenched in government, education, and law. 
Article 17 of the 1876 Constitution, which declared that all Ottomans were 
equal before the law, aimed to create citizens who were "alike and equal" 
before the law. Demand for equality had not only an official source but an 
intellectual one as well. For example, Nam1k Kemal, in an interview, said that 
he and his group desired to see an equal citizenship between Muslims and non-
Muslims.69 This was a reflection of the desire of many intellectuals and 
officials in Ottom8;11 Empire. 
The 1876 Constitution introduced another important principle: individual 
rights and civil liberties to be guaranteed without discrimination. Though 
dispensing justice and keeping social order was the traditional function of the 
Ottoman state, the 1876 Constitution guaranteed these rights, and further 
extended them in a significant way. Constitutional guarantees included 
inviolability of domicile, freedom of the press, freedom of establishing 
commercial association and companies, taxation according to one's means, 
security of property, prohibition of confiscation and torture, and the right to be 
represented in the government (elected or appointed). After 1876, liberals 
focused their attention on the strengthening and extension of these principles. 
69Davison, "Ataturk Reforms," in, Essays in Ottoman Turkish History (Austin: University of Texas 
Press, 1990), 244-246. 
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In this regard, the Constitution was meaningful, because what people 
understood from the Constitution was that both their rights and the limit of the 
Sultan's power were defined. After the Constitutional Commission submitted a 
draft to the Sultan, he said "one of the objects to which we attach much 
importance is that of safeguarding the sovereign rights. We therefore desire that 
the Constitution should be revised in the manner referred above." 
Constitutional thinking had entered into Ottoman intellectual circles in the 
1860s with the Young Ottomans. In the mid 1870s the constitution was 
explicitly discussed among intellectuals and some officials. There were many 
advocates of a Constitutional regime for whom a change in the structure of 
government was inevitable. 
During these earlr deliberations many names were used for constitution such 
as "$artname-i Esasi, Konstitusyon, Konstitusyon Kanunu, Kanun-u Me~veret, 
Kanun-u Esasi, Me~rutiyet, and Nizam-z Serbestane". 70 
The main focus of the Ottoman Constitutionalists was the limitation of the 
power of Sultan and the creation of a domain for participation. The introduction 
of the Representative Assembly was interpreted as a guarantee of this control. 
In this time, meaning of the Assembly was conceived as a means of 
represetation far beyond classical usu/-u me~veret, the muslim tradition of 
consultation by the monarch with distinguished members of the 
commumty. The Assembly was composed of deputies each representing 50,000 
Ottoman males, elected under provisional rules. It was a kind of Western-type 
chamber of deputies who had constitutional guarantee of parliamentary 
immunity. This immunity covered complete freedom of expression in speech 
7°Davison, "Ataturk Refonns," 250; Devereux, Constitutional, 54. 
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and voting. The immunity of deputies could not be removed except with a 
majority vote in the Assembly. They could be deprived of their post by two-
thirds vote of the Assembly upon proof of charges related to treason, bribery, or 
any attempt to violate the Constitution. To enact laws, deputies submitted their 
drafts to the grand vizier who presented those drafts to the Sultan. If the Sultan 
thought the proposed legislation was necassary, he sent it to the Council of 
State which drafted it into law. 
Deputies were given wide-ranging powers with respect to the budget. The 
Assembly had authority to prepare and control the budget, which was referred 
to the Assembly in every session. The government was not given authority to 
collect taxes without the Assembly's approval. Taxes would be levied 
proportionally, according to the wealth of taxpayer, and extraction of any 
. 
amount of money from people without explicit legal authority of law was 
forbidden. 71 This was an important development in the Ottoman case, because 
arbitrary taxation and extraction had seriously impaired accumulation of capital 
and subjugated the economic domain to the political one. State domination, in 
the long-run, had impeded the formation of a bourgeoisie which would 
germinate liberalism. The Assembly was in itself meaningful, because it 
represented the rights of people to participate in government, and it was hoped 
it would successfully restrain the Sultan from exercising arbitrary power .. When 
in 1878 the Assembly was dissolved by the Sultan at the first opportunity, it 
was clearly understood that Assembly had been successful in balancing the 
Sultan's arbitrary power and the Sultan himself had been disturbed by its 
effectiveness72• The Times described the Assembly as follows: 
71 Devereux, Constitutional, 69-70. 
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The Chamber of Deputies, in its two sessions, displayed a power of debate 
and a keen instinct for snatching at opportunities that would have done 
honor to a western chamber. Its members not only harangued, but 
deliberated; they not only deliberated, but claimed a right to have their 
advice listened to by the executive. So for as outward appearances went, 
the Deputies were true and honest representatives. They seemed to 
understand what was faulty in the machine of government and to have a 
certain comprehension of what was wanted to put it right. 73 
1876 Constitution was an important milestone in Turkish liberal history for its 
representation not on the basis of millet but equality of citizens. Reflection of 
this principle in the Assembly was successful. Muslims and non-Muslims 
regardless of religious differences worked efficiently, with full equality. They 
had reached a consensus for the necessity of reforms and associated within 
boundaries of mutual respect. 74 
Principles in the constitution could not function as it was hoped. At first those 
principals were not includeded in the Constitution because of the solely liberal 
demands. There was some external pressure on the Empire to improve the 
status of the Christians within its boundaries.A Russian threat to intervene in 
the Balkans on behalf of the Orthodox population, and consequently the fear 
of loss of territory was another stimulus for the promulgation of those 
principles in the Constitution. Nevertheless, those external factors could not be 
sufficient to explain the reason of the promulgated Constitution75• Since the 
beginning of the nineteenth century, Christians had been in contact with 
Western-inspired ideas of liberty and nationality. In the earlier stages of this 
awakening, they proclaimed loudly their desire for equality. It can be conclude9 
73 The Times (London) February 20, 1878 quoted in Devereux, Constitutional, 256. 
74Devereux, Constitutional, 255. 
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that this awakening and demands of those minorities were two sided. At first, 
such a demand triggered the formation of liberal principles such as equality, in 
the Ottoman Empire.On the other hand, this awakening also hindered the 
consolidation of those liberal principles, because, by the time those principles 
were introduced into the Ottoman society,the same minorities came to demand 
independence rather than equality and constitutional citizenship.Crete,for 
example, basically demanded autonomy or union with Greece, not equality. 
Other Greeks in the Empire also wanted union with Greece and the extension 
of Greek rule to Macedonia and Thessaly. Serbs wanted not equality but union 
with the autonomous principality of Serbia. Serbia and Rumenia, still within 
the Empire wanted national independence rather than equality. Those 
principles remained unrealized not because of bad faith on the part of the 
Ottoman statesmen, but because many Christians wanted it to fail. 76 
Another point worth noting is that some Ottoman officials saw the Constitution 
a means for funding off foreign intervention. They believed that a 
homogeneous Constitution would serve to deflect more serious demands of 
Great Powers to make reforms, preserve the independence and control 
territorial disintegration, introduce a new reorganization program, hinder 
internal decline and resusciate the empire. Nevertheless, the idea of a 
Constitution per se also had influential support amongst officials77• As -Henry 
Elliot proposed "Constitution was in every mouth and it was spoken of also in 
coffee houses and people were in expectation of the Constitution."78 
76 Davison, "Muslim-Christian Equality." in, Essays, 119. 
77 Ortayh, En Uzun, 211-212. 
78 T. Zafer Tunaya, "Anayasa Gelenegi," 29. 
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Defenders of the Constitution were not so satisfied because they believed that 
the Sultan could not be bound by Constitution as they expected. The Sultan 
also was not satisfied:"! made mistake when I wished to imitate my father 
Abdulmecid who sought reforms by permission and by liberal institutions. I 
shall follow the footsteps of my grandfather, Sultan Mahmud. Like him I now 
understand that it is only by force that one can move the people."79 Sultan was 
dissatisfied because he claimed that Constitution "substitutes their will for 
mine." Thus, the Sultan was reluctant about Constitution because he understood 
that his will must be limited and this disturbed him. However, the Sultan also 
understood that liberty and equality were foremost in people's minds. Then the 
Sultan claimed that "people are wrong in representing me as opposed to liberty. 
I know that a country must keep up with the times, but the excess of liberty to 
which one is unac~ustomed is as dangerous as the absence of all liberty". 80 He 
added that he could be preparing country for liberty by increasing educational 
opportunities. The promulgation and existence of Constitution was meaningful 
because the Constitution described the framework of a political society in 
which the use of arbitrary power is limited. The emergence of constitution in 
Europe after the decline of absolutisism brought with it the claim of 
supervising the practice of state power. The existence of a constitution meant 
politicat freedom of citizens, providing them with a room for their activities.It 
also limited state interference in this protected area. 
Constitutionalism is a result of liberalism. Liberalism prefers rule under law not 
arbitrary rule of rulers. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, it was 
79 Hakk1 Tank, Meclisi Mebusan 1877 Zabit Ceridesi quoted in Roderic Davison, Reforms, 
so H. de Blowitz, My Memoirs quoted in Davison Reforms, 
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inspired by the idea of social contract. Constitution is a certificate which attests 
limited and supervised power, and protect the citizens sphere offreedom.81 
In spite of its deficiencies, the promulgation of the Constitution was deeply 
meaningful because it indicated the ideal, the expected direction in a historical 
framework. Midhat Pa§a expressed his belief on this subject to Neue Freie 
Presse, as follows: 
the creation of a Constitution is very difficult and talces much time. A sovereign prince, 
accustomed to absolute power, can only be persuaded little by little to abandon his 
prerogatives. It is a difficult task but for all that one never need despair of reaching goal. 82 
Beyond this interpretation after the abolishment of the General Representative 
Assembly it is an important indicator that the Sultan could not officially abolish 
. 
the Assembly and the Constitution. It was a suspension and the deputies until 
their death had their salaries. In spite of the fact that the Constitution was 
obsolete, it was seen that the security, property, and honor of the people, 
Sultan as a servant, state on the base of Consultation and representation, 
emphasis on importance of people and their individual liberties, instead of 
monarchical sovereignty territorial sovereignty were introduced and deeply 
rooted· among the Ottomans. From the date of out of function of the 
Constitution until 1908 the liberal principles mentioned in the. 1876 
Constitution had been the main demands of liberals. 
81 Mustafa Erdogan, Anayasaczlik, Parlementerizm, Silahli Kuvvetler (Ankara: Siyasal Kitabevi, 1993), 1-3. 
82 Devereux, Constitutional, l 0 l. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
INTER CONSTITUTIONAL PERIOD 
MIZANCI MURAT: THE PERSONIFICATION OF OTTOMAN LIBERAL 
PARADOX 
After the dissolution of the Assembly and suspension of the Constitution, 
some intellectuals for a long time campaigned for the re-promulgation of the 
Constitution as a liberal demand in opposition to Abdiilhamid. The 
opposition was dispersed, non-monolithic, and unorganized. Within this 
unorganized opposition Murat Bey was one of the outstanding figures. He 
was one of the first intellectuals who percieved omnipotent state as the 
source of problems in the Ottoman Empire. in spite of his perception,his 
continuous report submission to the sultan, his agreement to give up struggle 
in return for reforms in the state and his insistence on the necassity of the 
strenghtened and tamed state poinetd out the inevibility of strong state in the 
paradigm of the Ottoman liberals. 
He was known for his courageous speech on liberty at Kuleli Military School. 
He taught history, on which he wrote one volume of Ottoman history and six 
volumes of general history (Tarih-i Umumi). 83 His books were very reputable 
in that period among the Ottomans who did not witness the life of Nam1k 
Kemal and Ziya P~a. They were in need of such writers and writings, but had 
83 E. E. Ramsaur, The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908 (Beirut: Khayats, 1965), 29. 
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to be contented with the novels of Ahmet Rasim and Ahmet Midhat Efendi. 
At such a time Mizanc1 Murat's work satisfied this need and helped the 
continuity of ideas of liberty which had been germinated previously. 84 His 
view of history, as expressed in his books, was that the whole of Europe's 
past was a preparation for the birth of liberty. 85 
Despite strict censorship he criticized the government in his paper, Mizan, 
which was "passed from hand to hand and revolutionary notices began to 
appear on the main streets and on the doors of Mosques" .86 His paper became 
so popular that he was called Mizanc1 Murat. His works indicated that the 
liberal opposition did not abandon its struggle, but at last he got in difficulty 
because of his criticism and fled to Europe to continue his opposition.87 
On the other hand, Ahmet Bedevi Kuran claimed that Mizanc1 Murat left the 
Empire because the Sultan did not take into consideration Murat's reports, 
which were related to the troubles of Empire and suggested as solutions 
reforms and application of the Constitution. The report was submitted to the 
Sultan in October 1895. From his memoirs it was understood that he accepted 
state officialdom to create a situation in which he could submit such reports to 
the Sultan. After the report, he was rosy that the Sultan would consult him in 
state affairs. However, he was disappointed that the Sultan never consulted 
him. In addition the persons who were recommended by Mizanc1 Murat were 
not appointed to the government. 88 Then he fled to Paris. In his memoirs he 
84 Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, lnki/ap Tarihimiz ve Jon Turk/er (Istanbul: Tan Matbaas1, 1945), 40-41. 
85 ~erifMardin, Jon Turklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 1895-1908 (Istanbul: tleti~im Yaymlan, 1992), 82. 
86 From Fehmi Caner's letter, quoted in Ramsaur, Prelude, 35. 
87 Erik Jan Zurcher, The Unionist Factor; The Role of The Committee of Union and Progrees in the Turkish 
National Movement, 1905- 1926 (Leiden: E. J.Brill, 1984), 15-16; Mardin, Jon Turk/er, 81-82; 
88 Kuran, inkzlap, 41. 
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explained the reasons of his departure. One was expressed thus "I think that I 
was a state official also. I promoted because of my honor and dignity. I had 
many plans for the future. I was comfortable and happy in my familial life as a 
result of my successful business life. In such conditions to depart the country 
voluntarily could force our state officials to a heart to heart talk to listen their 
conscience" 
In Paris, he met Ahmet Rlza who edited the paper Mechveret (published both 
in French and Turkish).Ahmet Riza was not pleased with the arrival of 
Mizanc1 Murat because he was a prestigious man among Ottoman 
intellectuals and Ahmet Riza considered him as a rival for leadership of the 
Young Turks. 
Ahmet Rlza's attitude discouraged Mizanc1 Murat. He was invited by the 
Khedive to Egypt to continue his activities. He wrote that he preferred to 
reside in Egypt89 because of the publication facilities. He believed that 
publication of Mizan in Egypt would shock the Sultan. The Palace believed 
that they could cope with the Khedive easily.However, the Sultan would have 
a nasty surprise to find out how mistaken he was about his influence over the 
Khedive.90 
In one of the copies of the Mizan published in Egypt, Mizanc1 Murat accused 
the viziers of the Empire of including the text of the constitution, Kanun-i 
Esasi, in the introduction of the Sa/name (Yearbook) but not practice it.91 He 
89 There was Young Turk group because the Egyptian Khedive implicitly aided Young Turks for opposition 
to Sultan Hamit. This guidance and favors made Egypt an auspicious place for them to maintain their 
opposition. 
90 Mizanc1 Murat, Miicahede-i Milliye, 106. 
91 Ibid., 123. 
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published his planned program for the the Committee of Union and Progress. 
It was composed of 21 articles. It is certain that a new constitutional 
administration which was compatible with conditions of Empire was 
indispensable according to his program which incorporated the following 
significant points: 
Article 4: State administration must be based on consultation and 
constitution which eliminate personal and arbitrary rule. 
Freedom of the press could be perceived as one of the main necessities 
of constitutionality. The essence of such a principle can not even be 
debated. There are some institutions which would consolidate the 
constitutional government and these institutions should be examined 
carefully. 
Article 5: All Ottomans are equal in their rights and responsibilities. 
Any exception against this equality will not be contemplated. Vaqf 
(foundation) land and imperial estates will be subject taxation. 
Because the Sultan should provide good example of being obedient to 
law, respect oflaws will ensure his dignity. 
Article 12: The Press is free and only obey the law. 
At the end of the program it was declared that the related articles of the 1876 
Constitution would function in situations where the civil rights of the 
Ottomans were not mentioned. Due to the fact that the 1876 Constitution was 
not so favorably received by the Europeans, the program should go beyond 
the 1876 Constitution.92 
The sultan was disturbed by publication of Mizan. Also, the Khedive was 
depressed by his rigid manner.The sultan contacted the British Government 
which arranged for the deportation of Mizanc1 Murat from Egypt. Then 
92 Ibid., 130-133. 
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Murat went to Paris again;93 this time there were other Young Turks who 
were pleased by his arrival.Dr. Ishak Si.ikuti and Dr. ~erafettin Magmuni were 
two significant figure among the Young Turks. The constitutionalist group in 
Paris was getting larger and this development annoyed Sultan Hamit. 
The growth of the Young Turks movement also necessitated a new program 
and plan of action. The majority of Young Turks demanded a session where 
Mizanc1 Murat was elected the new president of the Committee. Because of 
the stubborn behavior of Ahmet R.IZa, a problem emerged within the 
Committee. Under Mizanc1 Murat's leadership, a council was founded, and 
this council warned Ahmet Riza to behave in line with the Committee's 
decisions, one of which declared that Mechveret was the official paper of the 
CUP and it would be administered by Ahmet Riza, although there would be 
also a supervision council. Ahmet Riza's insistence on behaving in an 
autonomous manner compelled the Committee to declare that Ahmet Riza 
had no organic ties with the Committee and center of Committee was 
conveyed to Geneva to fortify this decision.94 
In Geneva Mizanc1 Murat published a booklet, "La Force et la Faiblesse de la 
Turquie: Les Caupables et les Innocent" in 1897. The heading of one chapter 
in this book was "Islam is fundamentally liberal, fanaticism is not a natural 
consequence of Islam".95 He concluded his books by the following 
proposals: 
93 Kuran, inkilap, 42. 
94 Mardin, Jon, 106-108. 
95 Ramsaur, Prelude, 41. 
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The reconstituted government must have a solid constitutional support 
which will permit it to protect the laws against the arbitrary 
encroachments of the Palace. This support will be, moreover, the key to 
the solution of the Ottoman problem. There are, among the present 
personnel, enough honest and enlightened men capable of constituting a 
normal government. The Oriental flexibility may perform wonders, once 
it is established that the government demands that one be honest and 
zealous. 
Supporting at least relative freedom of press, the existing evils will be 
combated: Confiscation of every fields of society by the Palace will be 
restored. The Moslem world will be taught that obedience to the 
established laws being a virtue, nevertheless scarcely constitutes a rule 
without exception. 
Turks are ripe for a constitutional regime. The proportional 
representation of the Constitution of Midhat is a happy inspiration. 96 
In Paris Ahmet R.tza continued to publish Mechveret as a vehicle for his own 
ideas, but as if it was the Committee's paper. Ahmet R.tza's obstinacy 
. 
escalated the problem into a division within the Committee.At first Mizanc1 
Murat was accused of giving priority to the minorities. He wrote an article as 
an answer to this claim and outlined that their aim was to contribute to the re-
promulgation of the 1876 Constitution, which provided freedom and equality 
regardless of religious difference.97 The division in the Committee gave 
Sultan Abdillhamit a chance to put his plans into practice. Abdillhamid 
understood the importance of Mizanc1 Murat in the Committee and planned to 
weaken the Committee by recalling him to Istanbul. The Sultan. had 
previously attempted to put his plan into action using of Yusuf Ziya Pa~a and 
Ebuzziya Tevfik as intermediaries, but this attempt had failed. In such a 
troublesome situation his second attempt, using Ahmet Celalettin Pa~a as an 
intermediary, succeeded. 98 
96 Murat Bey, La Force,58-59 quoted in Ramsaur, Prelude, 42-43. 
97 Ramsaur, Prelude, 40. 
98 Kuran, lnkzlap, 143-147. 
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Mizanc1 Murat had a deep feeling of homesickness and was upset about the 
Sultan's persecution of Young Turks within the Empire.99 Ahmet Celalettin 
Pa~a took adventage of Mizanc1 Murat's state of mind. He ensured that the 
Sultan would promise a general amnesty for all Young Turks who were in 
prison or in exile. He also persuaded Murat Bey that the Sultan was ready to 
make concessions and introduce reforms. The reforms were not introduced 
earlier,he said, because had the Sultan introduced those reforms, it would 
have been interpreted as if he had yielded to pressure and not acted 
according to his free will. However, of Murat Bey's return would create a 
peaceful atmosphere in the promulgation of reforms would be facilitated. 
Young Turks' de~ands focused on reforms and liberty for the political exiles. 
They are granted all this: the Sultan gives his word of honor as sovereign. To 
refuse would have been to create suspicion that their conduct canceled an 
arriere-pensee of personal interest. They had to accept.11100 
Promises of amnesty and promulgation of reforms was enough to tempt 
Mizanc1 Murat to go back to Istanbul. The promise of reforms was very 
important, because, in spite of his opposition to the arbitrary rule of the 
sultan, he thought that the state was extremely important and it needed to be 
strenghtened. Reforms could strenghten the state.Although some of his 
friends and the Committee's Istanbul branch tried to persuade him to change 
his mind. He did not because he believed sincerely that he would be 
99 Zurcher, Unionist, 15-16. 
100 Ramsaur, Prelude, 50. 
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instrumental in introducing reforms within on the basis of Sultan's promise: 
he hoped to domesticate center into the boundaries of the Constitution. 
In 1897 Mizanc1 Murat arrived in Istanbul. In August he was appointed 
member of the Council of State.He was soon disappointed because the Sultan 
did not keep his promises. Murat came to regret his decision and lost his self 
respect; he also felt that he had lost prestige among the CUP members. The 
injured party was not only Mizanc1 Murat, but the Committee as well. From 
Murat's arrival until 1906, the Committee did not recover its influence in 
Istanbul. Murat's arrival was one of the most devastating reverse! the 
Committee had experienced because he had been their idol. Murat for many 
of the Young Turks was the personification of the revival of the Empire: 
"When he suddenly turned out to be unworthy of the trust placed in him, 
. 
shock was so profound that their minds were numbed, their faith shattered and 
their spirits broken" .101 Mizanc1 Murat's return to istanbul shocked the Young 
Turks because in many ways he had been their source of inspiration. The 
Young Turks had identified fully with his idea of the state: "State is a 
company. Company means a kind of association in which all people within 
the boundaries of administration are bound up." This association is voluntarily 
establihed and it was an "Ottoman company" .102 Mizanc1 Murat did not focus 
on the relationship between political obligation and its Islamic sources. 
Mizanc1 Murat's experiences and reactions exemplified that period. At first, 
he was opposed to the Sultan for the introduction of civil liberties, freedom 
of the press and the formation of a sphere in which constitution would be 
101 Ramsaur, Prelude, 51. 
102 Mardin, Jon, 129. 
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meaningful. Mizanc1 Murat struggled for those principles alone. He did not 
have any relationship with any Committee until his exile. The CUP's Istanbul 
branch had been founded before Mizanc1 Murat flight to Paris but he did not 
contact them. This was an indicator of the early years of interconstitutional 
period, when the liberal-minded opposition was unorganized and individual-
based. This feature lasted until the empowerement of the Committee. 
Mizanc1 Murat was one of the first persons who perceived the "strong center" 
as a source of Ottoman problem. "The source of the Ottoman illness was 
strong center. Everything has an official color: science, literature, art even the 
demand for freedom and intellectual liberty" and this hindered the 
germination of the individual. 103 In spite of Murat Bey's perception of the 
source of this illness, he could not avoid to adorn to the center. "A 
. 
purification in line with the program of the party of reforms will restore the 
qualities of the state so admired formerly. Its (reigning family's) presence at 
the head of the Empire is necessary; without it Turkish power has no 
existence" .104 His acceptance of state officialdom and submission of reports 
to the Sultan over a long period stemmed from his hope that a "tamed" and 
strengthened center could be created. In time, his ideal of a tamed and 
strengthened center came to focus on the creation of a reliable political elite 
which could resuscitate the corrupted and arbitrary center.105 
After the promulgation of the second Constitution, Murat Bey started to 
publish Mizan in Istanbul. The paper again criticized the situation in which 
103 Mardin, Jon, 133. 
104 Ramsaur, Prelude, 42. 
105 Ibid., 129-130. 
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people's liberty was injured, 106 but this time the target of criticism was not the 
Sultan but the Committee of Union and Progress. This demonstrates two main 
tendencies in Turkish politics: (I). liberal demands were suitable for leading 
the opposition, and (2). the same people who demand the application of 
liberal principles in opposition become illiberal when in power. 
106 Ibid., 109. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS: 
ILLIBERAL PROPONENTS OF LIBERALISM 
The Committee of Union and Progress (the CUP) was founded in Istanbul in 
1889. The date of its founding is open to question, since according to Ahmet 
Bedevi Kuran, it was founded in 1892. Ibrahim Temo an Albanian, 
Caucasian Mehmet Re~it, Hiiseyinzade Ali Turan and Ishak Sukuti were 
founding member~ of the Committee. Ibrahim Temo was registered as the 
first member. Committee's original name was Jttihad-i Osmani Cemiyeti 
(Society of Ottoman Unity).107 At Ahmed Rlza's suggestion the name of 
Committee was changed to lttihad ve Terakki Cemiyeti (the CUP) in 1895.108 
The main impetus for the foundation of the CUP was the safety of the Empire 
and the need to prevent the practice of absolutism by the application of 
previously promulgated written Constitution, because they believed that the 
source of the problem was arbitrary, unrestricted power of the Sultan. 
The general attitude of Western countries was focused on the claim that the 
Christians within the Empire were under pressure, and their increased stress 
upon on this point triggered the Committee members to settle the Committee 
outside the Empire and persuade the Western countries that not only the 
107 Ahmet Bedevi Kuran, Inkilap Tarihimiz ve Jon Turk/er (1stanbul: Tan Matbaas1, 1945), 30. Tank Zafer 
Tunaya, Turkiye'de Siyasal Partiler, vol. 1 (istanbul: Hurriyet Vakf1 Yaymlan, 1988), 19. 
108 ~erif Mardin, Jon TUrklerin Siyasi Fikirleri, 29. 
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Christians were victims of arbitrary power of Sultan but also Muslims. 109 The 
Committee soon gained fame and its members rose considerably.The 
members were mainly students and bureaucrats. This enlargement stimulated 
the founders to organize a new meeting (onikiler ictimaz) in which they 
decided to collect dues for the needs of the Committee, assigning membership 
on the basis of member and branch affiliation. 110 This growth encouraged the 
Committee members to found branches within and outside of the Empire.111 
Ahmet Riza and Abdullah Cevdet were to be charged with the foundation of a 
Paris Branch. Hoca Kadri was head of Cairo Branch, Ishak Si.ikuti was 
founder of Geneva Branch and Ibrahim Temo was responsible for the 
Balkans. The Committee also had branches in Caucasia. One of the main 
activities of these branches was to publish papers in the name of the 
Committee. Mech~eret was the paper of the Paris Branch; Mizan and Osmanlz 
were published by the Geneva Branch, the Cairo Branch published Kanun-i 
Esasi and Hak. The Paris Branch was perceived at first glance as the active 
one which shaped the ideas of students in Istanbul which was the focal point 
but the Paris Branch functioned as the executive Committee. 112 It is generally 
agreed that the Committee was influenced by organizational structure of 
Carbonari. 113 Since, at this stage, the Committee had no revolutionary ideas, it 
was paradoxical to accept the structure of a revolutionary organization. 
Medical Academy students were strongly attracted to the ideas of the 
Committee. The Committee propagated its ideas by notifications on the street 
walls and walls of mosques. The Palace had not taken into account these 
109Kuran, ink1/ap, 31. 
110 M. Sfikril Hanioglu, The Young Turks in Opposition (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 72 
111 Tunaya, p.20. 
112 Kuran, ink1lap, 31. 
113 Ramsaur, Prelude, 15-16. 
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endeavors, but what disturbed the Sultan was his suspicion that these students 
were under the patronage of bureaucrats who could use them as a means for 
their aim.As a result, strict control over students and other opposition groups 
was ordered. However, close control could not succeed in preventing the 
Committee's activities; the Committee even become more popular as a result 
of its decision to accelerate the joining of effective persons to the 
Committee114 other than students. ~eyh Naili and Hac1 Ahmet Bey, who was 
directorate of War Ministry, were the outstanding figures who contributed to 
the popularization of the Committee115 
The Committee did not appear to be homogeneous organization. There were 
different ideas and fractions in it, but all of them came together under the 
opposition umbrel~a which focused on the "dethronement of Abdiilhamid and 
the proclamation of the Constitution," the ending of the arbitrary power of 
Sultan and re-promulgation of the Constitution. There were at least five 
groups in Istanbul, Paris, and London as the compositors of the Committee. In 
spite of the difference among them, the first article of the CUP program 
defmed the close ties which bound them together: 
The Ottoman Committee of Union and Progress is created by all 
Ottomans, is composed of men and women with aim of warning our 
compatriots and reforming the administrative system of the e~sting 
Ottoman government, which violates individual rights such as justice, 
equality, freedom, stops all Ottomans from progress and percipiated the 
fall of the motherland into the hands of foreign molestation and 
coercion.116 
114 Hanioglu, Opposition, 18 . 
115 Kuran, lnk1lap, 33-35 
116 Osrnanli Ittihat ve Terakki Cerniyeti Nizarnnarnesi quoted in Hanioglu, Opposition, 16. 
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The Committee had a centralized organization in which the central 
Committee was preeminent in decision making. One of these groups was 
which came together around the paper Hurriyet and leading person in this 
group was Selim Faris. The Hurriyet group, which had close ties with British 
government, was not powerful enough to shape the structure of the 
Committee. The second group, which was as ineffective as the first one was 
the Turco-Syrian Committee. The third group was the leading one in the 
ideological sphere. Ahmet R.J.za was eminent person in this group. This group, 
which was organized around Mechveret from the time of Mizanc1 Murat's 
leadership to 1902 Congress, acted in an autonomous way. The last group 
originated in Istanbul. Its members mainly belonged to military class. Third 
and fourth groups complemented each other, the former was generally 
concerned with th~ory and ideas, while the latter was prominent in action. 
Mizanc1 Murat appeared as the leading person of the fourth group. Third and 
fourth groups were allied against Prince Sabahaddin. 117 
Until Murat's arrival, Ahmet R.J.za was very influential among the Young 
Turks and headed the Committee. He started publishing of a paper. R.J.za 
declared their aims as follows: 
We ask for reforms not only for this or that province but for the Empire 
as a whole, not in favor of one nationality, but in favor of all Ottoiµans, 
Jews, Christians, and Muslims. We desire to advance in the path of 
civilization but above all we do not wish to advance by strengthening 
the Ottoman element while respecting the general conditions of 
Ottoman life. We are eager to preserve the peculiar originality of our 
Eastern civilization, and therefore, to borrow from the West only 
general results of its scientific evolution which are necessary to 
enlighten people aiming at liberty. 118 
117 Mardin, Jon Turk/er, 15-16. 
us Ahmet Rlza, "The Situation in Turkey," Times, November 1895, quoted in Hanioglu, Opposition, 78. 
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In spite of the revolutionary attitudes of the Paris Branch, the newly formed 
Istanbul Branch, composed of ulema, high ranking bureaucrats and military 
officials, adopted a revolutionary path to dethrone the Sultan and aimed at re-
proclamation of the Constitution. 119 
Ahmet Rlza was accused of publishing "Mechveret without 
me~eret( consultation)." As a result of this critique, after the meeting of the 
Committee, it was decided to form a Council of Inspection and Execution for 
the aim of hindering arbitrary actions of any person and to supervise the 
Committee's action to be in line with the regulations of the CUP. The 
Council was composed of five members. Mizanc1 Murat was elected as the 
director. As the assistant director <;iiriiksulu Ahmet was elected and members 
were Ishak Siikuti, Dr. Selanikli Naz1m and Dr. ~erafettin Magmuni. Ahmet 
Rlza became the editor of the Mechveret Fran~eis Supplement, but this 
supplement was under the supervision of a board. After Mizanc1 Murat's 
presidency relations between the Istanbul and Paris Branch were normalized 
by recognizing the Istanbul Branch as the executive committee. The joint aim 
was to. unite the opposition around support of the 187 6 Constitution 120• 
After the replacement of the young students with ulema, bureaucrats and 
military officials, the Committee became powerful. In 1876 the CUP Istanbul 
Branch had decided on the necessity of a coup; they prepared their plan, but 
secretary Nadir Bey informed ismail Pa~a about the Committee's plan and 
ismail Pa~a reported it to the Sultan. Many people who were sympathetic to 
119 Y.Hikmet Bayur, Tiirkjnkilabz Tarihi, vol 2, part4 (Ankara: ITK Basunevi, 1991), 12-13 
120 Hanio~lu, Opposition, 82-84 
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the Committee were arrested and sent to exile. After this failed trial, the CUP 
Istanbul Branch lost its influence among military officers and bureaucrats.Its 
power was exaggerated by the Palace, which strictly controlled and punished 
them. Not only the members but also bureaucrats who were sympathetic to the 
Committee were punished. This repression created an atmosphere in which 
students again became a dynamic part of the Committee. 121 
In European branches, after Mizanc1 Murat's departure, a collective 
leadership was established; ~erafettin Magmuni, <;iiriiksulu Ahmet, and Re~it 
Bey were the ones who took on the leadership.Mizanc1 Murat's return created 
a fertile sphere for Ahmet Riza, who claimed that Mechveret was the only 
opposition paper. 122However, Mizanc1 Murat's associates propagated that they 
were the legal representatives of the Committee, not Ahmet Riza, who was 
becoming more and more powerful within Committee and playing for 
leadership again. Ahmet Riza sent messages to the branches to imply that he 
was ready to work with them. Some members, on the direction of Abdullah 
Cevdet, supported the leadership of Ahmet R1za. Additionaly, his rejection of 
negotiating with the Sultan made him credible in the eyes of some other the 
CUP members. 
Broken promises of the Sultan forced the CUP members to revitalize previous 
activities. 123 As an outcome of this idea a new paper, Osmanlz, was published 
in Geneva, by ishak Sukuti. It accused the Sultan of not fulfilling the 
promises related to constitutional reform. Such a proclamation shifted the 
sympathy of European public to the CUP. ishak Siikuti, Tunal1 Hilmi, Akil 
121 Hanioglu, Opposition, 104-105. 
122 ibid, 108-110. 
123 Bayur, Turk lnkzlabz, 42 
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Muhtar, Abdullah Cevdet, Refik Bey and Halil Muvaffak were the members 
of newly established center which aimed to resuscitate the Committee. The 
Geneva center invited Ahmet R.tza to the Committee under the same 
conditions as before his expulsion from the Committee; he agreed and 
abandoned publishing of Mechveret. The joining of Ahmet R.tza strengthened 
the new center, which tried to reestablish previous ties with other branches 
and demanded their support. They also critized former comrades who had 
accepted governmental posts in Empire. Geneva prepared a new code in 
which the Executive Committee was given a large amount of authority, and 
the Istanbul branch was assigned as the center. In essence these alterations in 
the code consolidated the power of Geneva over organization within the 
Empire. Geneva could become a directing center and organize the activities of 
the branches which would have power in their domestic affairs. 124 
The introduction of the Executive Committee weakened the position of 
Ahmet R.tza, who rejected the situation and suggested that the Geneva branch 
associate with his group in Paris. Ahmet R.tza also disagreed with the new 
center's revolutionary and activist manner. The split between Ahmet R.tza and 
the Geneva branch encouraged the Palace to bargain with the Geneva branch's 
members. The focus of bargaining was the release of the imprisoned Young 
Turks. The letters of the imprisoned members to Geneva for help were. used 
by Geneva to legitimize their negotiations with the Palace. After these 
negotiations, the exiles, on condition of promising that they would not attend 
the seditious activities of the Committee, were released. In spite of this truce, 
the Geneva Executive Committee continued its publications. Later the 
Geneva with the Paris branch published an open letter which included some 
124 Hanioglu, Opposition, 112-117. 
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advice to the Sultan as Mizanc1 Murat had done. During the negotiations the 
Committee found itself in a difficult situation. Ottoman diplomats influenced 
Swiss authorities, who took action against the CUP. The members were 
persecuted and their activities were investigated. In the last stage of 
negotiations it was agreed that the CUP leaders would return to Istanbul, and 
they could promoted to Ottoman embassies. ishak SUkuti was appointed to the 
Rome Embassy and Abdullah Cevdet to the Vienna Embassy as doctors, and 
Tunali Hilmi to Madrid as an Embassy clerk in 1900.125 
Following the truce between the Palace and the CUP, the CUP fell into 
disfavor among members within Empire. They believed that the members 
again had bought off the Committee, in spite of the release of Young Turks, 
an action which reminded the members of the situation of Mizanc1 Murat. 
The peace between the CUP and the Palace discouraged all members about 
the future of the Committee; for many of them resuscitation of the Committee 
was impossible. 
Mizanc1 Murat's truce with the Sultan and his arrival in Istanbul had nasty 
influences on the Committee, but an event contributed to overcome these 
influences, interrupt Sultan Hamid's celebration of victory, and create a 
sphere in which Young Turks could be optimistic about the future: the flight 
of Damat Mahmut P~a to Paris and his joining the Young Turks, who 
perceived him as the new potential leader. 
Damat Mahmut claimed that he was induced to depart because of his liberal 
ideas. His arrival in Paris aroused the interest of the European press. Within 
125 Ibid., 125-134. 
59 
the Committee, Mahmut Pa~a was perceived as a potential leader who could 
unite the Committee's divided groups. His arrival tempted many opponents to 
associate with the Young Turk Movement. Mahmut P~a started to connect 
with Ahmet Rlza, who invited to publish Mechveret and work together. Such 
a revitalizing action disturbed the Palace. 
In 1900, a new center was established in Geneva under directorship of 
Mahmut Pa~a. Other founder members were Ali Haydar Midhat, Hliseyin 
Siyret, Sabahaddin Bey and Llitfullah Bey. However, this new center created a 
conflict among Mahmut P~a and old the CUP Executive Committee 
members.Osmanlz started to be published again by Nuri Ahmet under the 
control of Mahmut Pa~a. 
Under Damat Mahmut Pa~a's leadership, the most outstanding change in the 
Committee's policy its adoption of a pro-British stand. The center of 
committee was carried to London, where two fractions coexisted and where a 
paper began to be published. Under Mahmut Pa~a's leadership, the 
Committee was not as active as it had been previously. In spite of this 
passiveness, the CUP was the only group with which Ottoman liberals could 
associate, as Tunal1 Hilmi claimed: "although there are various groups among 
the Young Turks, such as revolutionary, peaceful, advocates of the 
Constitution, as well as those against the Constitution, it is nevertheless the 
group that existed in which every liberal Young Turk found an advantage in 
participating 126 
126 Tunah Hilmi, Murad (38-39) quoted in Hanioglu, Opposition, 158. 
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In the capital, it was heard that Young Turks would organize a Congress 
which would be a joint action of Young Turks, Armenians, and Macedonian 
organizations. Following Sabahaddin Bey's invitation which concluded that 
the aim of the congress was to look for solutions related to reestablishing 
liberty andjustice127, the Palace was further disturbed and took precautions to 
curtail such an organization. On the Young Turks side, preparations were 
completed, and some elected representatives who were prominent opposition 
figures arrived in Paris, but as a result of Ottoman diplomats' efforts in m 
Paris the congress was endangered. The Committee members were informed 
that the Congress of Young Turks in Paris was banned by Ministry of 
Interior128 • They started to talk about the possibility of convening a Congress 
in London. On the other hand, they tried to persuade the French authorities to 
allow the meeting to be held in Paris. At the end they succeeded and French 
. 
authorities permitted the Congress on the condition of holding its sessions not 
in public but in a private residence129 
Representatives, who were elected by the Coordinating Committee, were 
composed of Albanians, Armenians, Greeks, Arabs, Kurds and even Jews. 
Their common feature was their opposition to Sultan because of his arbitrary 
rule. 
A draft program summerized the CUP's position as follows: 
1) necessity of the existence of the Ottoman Royal House and obedience 
to the loyalty of this dynasty's illustrious name within the legitimately 
vested power, 
127 Y.H.Bayur, Turk ink1labi, 42. 
128 Ramsaur, Prelude, 77. 
129 Hanioglu, Opposition, 179-180. 
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2) granting to Muslim and non-Muslim Ottoman subjects an equal share 
in the material and moral benefits by trying to unite them politically, 
3) acceptance of the 1876 Constitution whose guiding principles for 
domestic and foreign policy would serve for the unity among all 
Ottoman subjects." 130 
This program was published and distributed to the delegates. 
Forty seven delegates participated in the Congress, which was held on 4 
February 1902. The first session opened with a speech by Lutfullah Bey, who 
thanked Ottoman liberals for their endeavor and the host for his kind 
assistance. 131 
Prens Sabahaddin, who was chosen as chairman, claimed in his speech that 
the continuous war was between liberty and absolutism, and the source of the 
problem was the Ottoman administrative system. 
After first session,a resolution formulated as follows, was printed: 
we intend to establish close ties between the different peoples and races 
of the Empire, an entente which will assure to all, without distinction, 
the full enjoyment of their rights recognized by the hatts and 
consecrated by the international treaties, will procure for them the 
means of satisfying in a complete fashion their legitimate aspirations to 
take part in local administration, will put them on an equal position 
from the point of view of the rights as well as the duties incumbent 
upon all citizens. 
130 Ahrat-1 Osmaniye Kongresi, Muvazene no.224. quoted in Hanioglu, Opposition, 185. 
131Hanioglu, Opposition, 188. 
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We shall apply in all circumstances to coordinate the desires of all the 
Ottoman people and the efforts of all patriots toward respect for the 
fundamental laws of the Empire, notably of the Constitution 
promulgated in 1876 which is incontestably the most important part and 
which offers the surest and most precious guarantee of general reforms, 
the rights and the political liberties of Ottoman people against the 
arbitrary rule. 132 
In the final resolution of the First Congress of Ottoman liberals, as usual, 
emphasized liberty and necessity of Constitution: "to transform the present 
regime of government into a regime of liberty and of justice such that it will 
assure the re-establishment of the Constitution". 133 
In 1902 First Congress of Ottoman liberals indicated that the demands of all 
groups (whether based on ethnicity or ideas) were different. In essence the 
important differe~ce which was perceived was that between Prens 
Sabahaddin's group and Ahmet Riza's group. This split meant a division 
between nationalists and liberals within the CUP. 134 
Toward the end of the Congress Prens Sabahaddin declared that after the 
convention a new society would be founded. For this aim Lutfullah Bey 
donated 25 000 Fr. 135 
After First Congress the Committee entered into a new period which 
continued until 1906, and signalled years of silence for Committee. Even the 
name of the Committee was not mentioned, with the exception that Ahmet 
Riza's group tried to keep the Committee alive. 136 
132 Quoted in Ramsaur,Prelude, 67-68. 
133 Final Declaration of the Congress quoted in Ramsaur, Prelude, 71. 
134 B.Lewis, Modern, 200. 
135 Hanioglu, Opposition, 193. 
136 Ibid., 199. 
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Ahmed R.tza's group was the leading force in the resuscitation of the 
Committee within the Empire during 1906, when the center of movement was 
not Istanbul but in Salonica and Monastir. European surveillance over Sultan 
Hamit prevented the sultan Sultan from controlling effectively the liberals in 
the Balkans; as a result this region became the center of the Young Turk 
movement. 137 During this period, liberals in Balkans with were unite and the 
liberal movement strengthened. The members of the Committee were 
commonly composed of dissatisfied military officers. 
After the flight from istanbul of Dr. Bahaddin ~akir and Sezai Bey, Paris the 
branch was strengthened by their endeavors. They started to publish a paper in 
Turkish Sura-i Ommet in addition to Mechveret. Bahaddin ~akir's increasing 
power in the Committee accelerated the rupture between nationalists and 
. 
liberals to the advantage of nationalists. 138 
After the arrival of Omer Naci and Hiisrev Sarni who were members of 
Osmanli Hiirriyet Cemiyeti (Ottoman Society of Liberty), they planned to 
examine the programs of Ahmed R.tza and Prens Sabahaddin. After they had 
scrutinized Ahmet R.tza's ideas, they perceived that they were close to his 
ideas. 'The only point of difference was Ahmet R.tza's approval of using 
violence. For the sake of unity, Ahmet R.tza conceded to this point and it was 
declared that the two Committees were united under the title of ittihad ve 
Terakki Cemiyeti (Committee of Union and Progress.) Their program was as 
follows: 
137 Ramsaur, Prelude, 96-91. 
138 Mardin, Tiirk Modernle~mesi, 99. 
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Article 1 : the society shall have two headquarters, the one being internal 
and other external. The external headquarter will be in Paris, and the 
internal headquarter will be that now located in Salonica, and the two 
center will have separate chiefs. 
Article 2: the fundamental purpose is to bring into force and continue 
the Constitution of Midhat P~a published in 1876. In order to attain 
this goal, the society will have two separate sets of regulations for at 
home and abroad, taking into consideration local requirements and 
tendencies and defining the organization and the duties of 
individuals. 139 
Between 27-29 December 1907, after the unification of the two Committees 
for creating a joint sphere within liberal demanded opposition, the Second 
Congress of Ottoman liberals was organized under the presidency of Ahmet 
R.Iza, Prens Sab~addin and the Armenian Revolutionary Army in Paris. 
Representatives of Second Congress worked in a harmonious way and 
founded a permanent Committee which aimed to fulfill the program of the 
congress. The program outlined that the aim was the proclamation of the 
Constitution and establishment of representative government. For the first 
time the revolutionary way was pronounced in the CUP. 
The first stage of the 1908 Revolution triggered in the Balkans. Enver Bey, 
who was the member of the CUP, to indicate his disturbance for Sultan's 
newly strict control over the Balkan corps the CUP s, took to the mountains. 
In July another officer, Niyazi Bey followed Enver Bey with his comrades 
and ammunition.140 These were not the first uprisings in that year. Previously 
in Anatolia, in Erzurum and Van, some uprisings had occurred to protest the 
139 Quoted in Ramsaur, Prelude, 123. 
140 Ibid., 134-135. 
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corruption within the state. But the Balkan uprising did not seek satisfaction 
of partial demands but gave the birth the re-promulgation of the 1876 
Constitution which was the main demand of liberals for 30 years. 
After the re-proclamation of the Constitution, "Enver Bey exclaimed that 
arbitrary government had disappeared. Henceforth, cried this enthusiastic 
leader of revolution, we are all brothers. There are no longer Bulgars, Greeks, 
Romans, Jews, Muslims; under the same blue sky we are all equal, we glory 
in being Ottoman."141 
The Constitution was put into effect and the Ottoman Empire became again a 
Constitutional state which limited the power of Sultan and guaranteed 
freedom and equality. In 1 August 1908, Sultan published a hatt in which the 
necessity of the Constitution was emphasized. It was also declared that 
without regard to race or religion all citizens would be equal before the law; 
without proof and trial citizens could not be punished; all citizens would have 
freedom of expedition; the freedom of the press and of education would be 
guaranteed. 142 All privileges on the basis of religion and race were 
eliminated. By creating citizenship the authority of the Church, which 
represented the Christians, declined, because by the Constitution, the 
individual was prominent, not the community. Citizenship guaranteed rights 
of individuals, and also the power of controlling the government by means of 
their elected representatives. 143 
141 Max Muller, The Ottoman Empire and its Successors, 74, quoted in Ramsaur, Prelude, 137. 
142 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi (istanbul: 1Ieti~im Yaymlan,1995), 161-162. 
143 Ibid., 217-218. 
66 
The CUP declared its aims in its program. The main change that the CUP 
demanded in the re-promulgated Constitution was the annulment of Article 
113, which limited the freedom of citizens. Another demand focused on the 
responsibility of government to the elected Assembly. Limitations on 
participating in elections were abolished. The property qualification to be a 
voter was annulled. All citizens over the age of twenty would be able to 
vote.144 
Article 9 of the CUP program declared the intention to strengthen equality 
without distinction on the basis of religion or ethnic affiliation. 
As quoted, the CUP's program included some liberal principles under the 
heading of freedom, equality, and individualism. Aykut Kansu claimed that 
the aim of the Committee was a transformation toward a liberal democratic 
state. 145 
In September 1909, the Constitution in its new form was publicized. The new 
Constitution was based on the 1876 Constitution; however, one article was 
abolished, twenty-one articles were amended and three articles were 
promulgated. The 1909 Constitution certainly limited the power of the Sultan, 
in Article 3 it has clearly indicated that the power of the Sultan was bound by 
the Constitution.146 
144 Tunaya, 66. 
145 Aykut Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, 228-232. 
146 Article 3: "Zati Hazreti Padi~ah-i hin-i cUluslarmda Meclis-i Umumide ve Meclis mUctemi degilse ilk 
ictimamda ~er-i Serif ve Kanun-i Esasi Ahkarnma riayet ve vatan ve millete sadakat edecegine yemin 
eder." Quoted in $eref GOzilbUyUk and Suna Kili, Turk Anayasa Metinleri, 70. 
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The Sultan's power in the name of government for appointment of officals 
and public expenditure was limited by the confirmation of the Assembly. 
According to the Article 7, Sultan could nominate high rank officials under 
certain conditions and could sign treaties in the name of government only by 
the confirmation of the Assembly. 
Article 27 was another limitation on the Sultan's power. The power to appoint 
ministers did not belong to the Sultan but to Sadrazam with the confirmation 
of the Sultan.147 
In Article 77 the Sultan's power to appoint president and vice president of the 
Assembly was annulled. They were elected for one year by a majority vote of 
the Assembly's. 
Article 113 which had authorized the Sultan to send people to exile, was 
abolished. 
Articles 29, 30, 35, 44, 53, and 54 drastically changed the power balance 
between the Assembly and the Palace to the advantage of the Assembly. 148 In 
Article 30 Ministers had collective and individual responsibility to the 
Assembly. 149 
147 Article 27: "te§kili viikelaya memur olan sadrazamm tasih ve arz1 ile sair viikelanin memuriyeti dahi ba 
irade-i §ahane icra olunur," quoted in ~eref Gl>ziibUyUk and Suna Kili, Anayasa, 10. 
148 Feroz Ahmad, lttihat ve Terakki: 1908-1914 (istanbul: Kaynak Yaymlan, 1986), 108. 
149 Article 30: "Vnkela hnkumetin siyaseti umumuyesinden musteken ve daire-i nezaretime ait muamelattan 
dolay1 mUnferiden Meclisi Mebusana kar§l mesuldurler," quoted in GOziibUyUk and Kili, Anayasa, 1 l. 
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Article 35 indicated the superiority of citizens' representatives over the 
Cabinet; if there was a conflict between the Assembly and the Cabinet, the 
last word would be with the Assembly.150 
Article 38 further strengthened the power of the Assembly over the Cabinet. 
The Assembly had authority for interpallation for any minister in any subject. 
If the minister lost a vote of confidence after interpallation, he would be 
dismissed from the Cabinet. If the one under interpallation was Sadrazam and 
a vote of confidence was lost, then the Cabinet would be discharged. 151 
Articles 53 and 54 also encouraged the representatives power over the 
cabinet, the suggestion for the promulgation of law previously belonged to the 
Cabinet alone, but in those articles it was declared that from now on the 
Assembly also had the same authority. 
Thus, the aim of limiting the power of Sultan and strengthening the power of 
peoples' representatives (Assembly) was reached by the promulgation of the 
Constitution.152 
Individual freedom was also emphasized and guaranteed m the 
Constitution.153 Freedom of press, which was one of the outstanding demands 
150Article 35: "Vilkela ile Heyeti Mebusan arasmda ihtilaf vukuunda vukela reyinde 1srar edupte Mebusan 
canibinden katiyen ve mtikerreren red edildigi halde Vtikela ya mebusanm kararm1 kabule veya istifaya 
mecburdur," quoted in GozilbUyOk and Kili, Anayasa, 71. 
151 Article 38: Istizahi madde i~in Vtikeladan birinin huzurunda Meclisi Mebusanda ekseriyetle .karar 
verilerek davet olundukta ya bizzat bulunarak yahut rnahiyetindeki rUesay1 memurinden birini gondererek 
irad olunacak suallere cevap verecek yahut ltizum gortir ise mesuliyet uzerine alarak cevabmm tehirini talep 
etmek hakkm1 haiz olacaktir. Netice-i istizahta Heyeti Mebusanm ekseriyeti ile hakkmda adrni itimat beyan 
olunan nazrr sak1t olur. Reisi Vtikela hakkmda admi itimat beyan olundugu halde Heyet-i Vtikela hep birden 
sukut eder," qouted in G6zilbUyOk and Kili, Anayasa, 72. 
152 Ahmad, ittihat, 111. 
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of liberals, was also guaranteed within the boundaries of law by the 
Constitution.154 
The re-promulgation of a Constitution which included liberal principles 
created great expectations among the Ottomans. The day of re-promulgation 
was celebrated as the "Day of Liberty" among the Ottomans.155 To a degree 
those expectations had been satisfied. In this situation the number of 
publications drastically increased. Every paper which represented the groups 
and their ideas germinated the freedom of expression. There was also an 
increase in the number of parties and associations, which reflected the 
participation of citizens in governmental affairs. 
After the Constitution, the subject (tebaa) was transformed into the citizen 
whose rights and responsibilities were guaranteed in a written form. The 
participation of citizens into political affairs increased drastically to a degree 
in which people equated themselves with the government and expressed their 
ideas to shape governmental policies. They did not perceive governmental 
affairs only as the affairs of Sultan and his officials; the State was not an 
entity which belong to a dynasty but was a constitutional entity. 156 
If this development had had a chance to continue, Turkish liberalism vvould 
have reached a further stage. However, the Committee's policies after the 31 
March event prevented rather than improved this liberal accumulation. In this 
period the freedoms of citizens were restricted radically. The freedom of 
153 "Hilrriyeti ~ahsiye her tiirlO taaruza masundur. Hi\: kimse ~eri ve kanunun tayin ettigi sebep ve surette 
maada bir bahane ile tevkifve mucazat olunamaz." 
154 "Matbuat kanun dairesinde serbesttir. Hi~ bir vechile kablel-tab-i tefti~ ve muayeneye tabi tutulamaz." 
155 Mehmed Cahid, Siar'm Defteri, quoted in Kansu, 1908 Devrimi, vii. 
156 Tunaya, Hurriyetin ilanz, 27-28. 
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holding meetings , freedom of expression and freedom of founding 
associations were limited. A decline in the number of publications was 
observed easily at the first glance. Journalists who had opposed the practice of 
the Committee in the name of freedom were assasinated. Associations and 
parties which inclined toward liberal principles were under pressure and 
forced to disband. 157 
Another deviation from the CUP's principles occured in the Assembly. The 
CUP was the pioneer of the liberal opposition which demanded the re-
promulgation of Assembly in a desired way. However, in power they 
suspended the same Assembly repetitively. The suspension of the Assembly 
aimed to increase the power of the Cabinet over the Assembly and to practice 
without control of the Assembly. Such a practice had been criticized by the 
CUP during the reign of Abdiilhamid and was forbidden by 1909 
Constitution.158 In a short time the CUP eliminated the liberal opposition and 
became the sole authority in the government. The CUP was the single party in 
the government and exercised power as Sultan Hamit had. Until 1918 the 
Ottomans witnessed the previous pseudo-liberal Committee's absolutist 
practice. 159 The disparity between the demands of the CUP in opposition and 
its practice in power was dramatic. 
The Committee's absolutist behavior created an opposition group whose-
members had resigned from the CUP. This movement disturbed the 
Committee because the liberal group was growing day to day.160 The 
IS7 Ibid., 18. 
iss Tunaya, Hiirriyetin llam, 24-26. 
is9 Mim Kemal Oke, "Siyonistlerin ittihat~dar Nezdindeki Ba~ans1z Giri~imleri," 128. The Committee 
transformed itself in the government politically centralist and economically etatist. 
160 Tunaya Hiirriyetin ilam. 37. 
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Committee tried to avoid this development by an absolutist practice as to 
amend the power of Cabinet over the Assembly. By this amendment the 
Committee paradoxically tried to revive the rights of Sultan as were 
formulated in 1876 Constitution. It was interesting enough that the Committe 
for a long time had struggled against the rights of Sultan and tried to limit his 
arbitrary power. But in 1911 it planned to give back these rigths to Sultan 
because the Sultan Re~ad was not powerful as to practice those rights and the 
CUP itself aimed to use those powers. When the Assembly rejected this 
amendment, the Committe in 1911 guided the Sultan to dissolve the 
Assembly. By the support of Meclis-i Ayan, the Assembly was dissolved and 
an election was held in 1912 under the pressure of the CUP. The Committee 
(now party) had reached the majority which allowed it to establish his 
absolutist control of the Assembly. After reaching the majority in Assembly, 
the CUP did not feel itself bound by the Constitution and tried to dominate 
every field of society. Under the governance of the CUP after 1909 
"individual rights and freedoms could not be practiced,"161 in spite of the fact 
that those individual rights were guaranteed in the Constitution very 
emphatically. 
To understand the dilemma of the Committee, which was based on liberal 
demands in opposition but absolutist practices in govemement, a close 
examination of the structure and principles of the CUP is necessary. 
a) The outstanding idea of the CUP was the safety of the state and the idea of 
constitutionalism (liberal principles) which for a while seemed to be the 
solution, because a Constitution, on the basis of liberal principles, could 
161 Ibid., 40; Ahmad, "vanguard," 1. 
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create Ottoman citizenship, which would hinder the dissolution of the 
Ottoman state. However, the rising nationalism among the Balkan peoples, 
whose main claim shifted from constitutional rights to an autonomous state, 
made constitutionalism obsolete for the CUP. 
b) Liberalism was not adequately understood among the CUP members. The 
struggle within the Committe during the oppostion and practices during the 
government proved this. 
c) In the CUP, the idea of the priority of community over individual was still 
generally accepted. Ishak Siikuti and Abdullah Cevdet founded a school in 
which they tried promote their ideas; and to raise a generation who were 
instilled with these ideas. An example,as follows, serve to indicate their ideas 
on the individual versus the community:if a student made a mistake in class, 
they would punish not only the student but the whole class. By such a 
practice they tried to foster the "collective" idea and suppress the motion of 
the "individual". The domination of the solidarist ideas of Ziya Gokalp over 
liberal ideas in a short time had its roots in those ideas. 
d) The idea of the necessity of an elite was deeply rooted in the mentality of 
the Committe members. In his early writings Mizanc1 Murat dreamed of the 
creation of an elite who could tame and stregthen the state. In a continuious 
way the Committe members advocated themselves as the core of this elite. 
$iikrii Hanioglu claimed that Le Bon's ideas were very effective among 
Young Turks, who often cited Le Bon. In their publications the only lasting 
theme was the condemnation of people who "could not appreciate the efforts 
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of these distiguished individuals [Young Turks]". 162 It was difficult for people 
to reach correct decisions by themselves and it may be because of this belief 
that the Committe members strongly emphasized the importance of education 
by which the people could be guided. 163 
Gustave Le Bon depicted assemblies as a kind of mob and warned that they 
could be dangerous for any society. 164 In spite of the Committee's praise of the 
Constitution and Assembly, their actions in suspending the Assembly and 
encroachment of the Constitution probably reflected the influence of Le Bon's 
ideas on the Committe. 
162 Mechveret, no.26. Mektub, October 25, 1897, quoted in Hanioglu, Opposition. 
163 Hanioglu, Opposition, 205-207. 
164 Ibid., 31-32. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
THE RUPTURE FROM TRADITION: PRINCE SABAHADDIN AND THE 
LIBERAL PARTY 
In one of his writings Yusuf Ak.9ura argued that the majority of contemporary 
political scientists (siyasetniivis) and economists were liberals. Cahit Bey and 
Liitfii Bey were examples of liberal political scientists; Cavit Bey and Hamit 
Bey were examples of liberal economists. But the wholehearted proponents of 
liberal principles were the members of the Te~ebbiisi ~ahsi ve Ademi 
Merkeziyet Cemiyeti (Free Initiative and Decentralization Committee, FIDC). 
The seeds of this formation could be seen in the First Congress of Ottoman 
Liberals in 1902. That Congress indicated the wide gap between the liberals 
and nationalists within the Committee of Union and Progress. After sessions 
Prince Sabahaddin declared that they would establish a new Committee for 
which'Liitfullah Bey donated 25 000 Fr. 165 The Committee that was planned 
to be established during the First Congress was the FIDC, which defended 
liberal principles such as individualism and the limited state against the CUP's 
nationalist members. 
The founding members of the Committee were Prince Sabahaddin (chairman), 
Dr. Rifat, Dr. Sabri, Dr. Nihat Re~at, Ismail Kiinal, Miralay (Colonel) Zeki, 
Hiiseyin Tosun and Hiisrev Siret. 
165 Hanioglu, Opposition, 193. 
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Their paper was Terakki, which started to be published in 1906, and paper 
were dedicated to the principles of Constitution, Free Initiative and 
Decentralization.166 
In a short time the Committee established branches in Istanbul, Trabzon, 
Erzurum and Izmir. The activities of the Committee were considered illegal 
and attepmts were made to suppress them. In spite of heavy supression, the 
Committee was popular among students, merchants, and minorities. 
The Committee aimed to create productive and active individuals who were 
indispensable actors of liberalism. The committee planned to reach the aim by 
means of decentralization and restricting the power of the state. The 
Committee percei~ved unlimited state power as the source of many illnesses 
in the Empire and the panacea was to weaken the state power and create a 
fertile domain for individuals. 
The individual was emphasized strongly in the Committe, so strongly in fact 
that they divided societies into two groups: "individual-based" societies such 
as the USA and Britain, and "community-based" societies such as the 
Ottoman Empire and Asian societies. They tried to explain the development 
of Western societies on the basis of strong individuals. Consequently,- they 
aimed to empower the individual in Ottoman society and to transform old 
centralized Ottoman institutions in an individualist and participative manner. 
The Committee proposed that the limits of the centralized state were so large 
that it encroached and dominated the domain of individuals. The roots of this 
166 Cenk Reyhan, "Tilrkiye Liberalizminde bir Oneil Parti" Tiirkiye Giinliigii, 31 (November-December 
1994), 77 
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problem were to be found in the early days of the Empire. During the process 
of consolidation of the Empire, the center undermined equal power centers to 
strengthen its own absolutist power. The power of voluntary organizations 
such as guilds, was diminished also. After the dominance of the center, a 
bureaucratic class came into being and the strength of the state was the 
cardinal goal for them. This goal facilitated state intervention in every 
conceivable field in society and drove away individuals from governmental 
affairs. To diminish the power of this bureaucratic class by weakening their 
linkages with the military would pave the way for the genesis of the 
individual. 
The Committee proposed that ownership of land made the state dominant 
over individuals, so land and property relations had to be changed. The 
farmers should become the owners of the land they cultivated. Such an 
ownership increased the power of the individual farmers against the state. The 
FIDC also believed in the necessity of supporting commercial groups who 
would be influential in creating a sphere of freedom against the state. 
The first link of the chain in Ottoman liberalism had been the Free Initiative 
and Decentralization Committee. The Liberal Party was the second link and 
was established on the legacy of the FIDC. 
THE LIBERAL PARTY (AHRAR FIRKASI) 
Bernard Lewis claimed that the Liberal Party was the outstanding 
representative of Ottoman liberalism against the CUP's absolutist practices.167 
167 Lewis, Modern, 213. 
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The Committee was established after promulgation of Second Constitution 
and was opposed to the CUP's absolutist practices on the basis of liberalism. 
The founders of the Committee were Nurettin Ferruh, Ahmet Fazh, Klbnsh 
Tevfik, Naz1m Bey, ~evket Bey, Celalettin Arif and Mahir Sait Bey. 
Ahmet Fazh Bey, Mahir Sait Bey, Celalettin Arif Bey and Nurettin Ferruh 
Bey had been active members of the FIDC and also founders of the Liberal 
Party. 168 This could prove the close relation between the two liberal 
organizations. 
Some liberal members of the CUP joined the party. After the Second 
Constitution's promulgation in 1908, absolute power of the Palace had been 
drastically weakened, and so liberal members of the CUP believed that the 
Comittee's role was ended. However, the Committee insisted to substitute the 
Sultan's power and this forced liberal members to resign from the CUP and 
join the Liberal Party.169 The chief principles of the Liberal Party were 
individualism, liberalism and free entepreneurship, and a weakened, 
decentralized state was seen as a facilitating regime for the realization of these 
principles. 
The Program of Liberal Party included many liberal principles: 
Article 1: People are born free and they are equal before the law. 
Liberty, the right of property, the right of security, freedom of action, 
freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom of trade, freedom of 
communication, freedom of education are our primacy. Basic rights can 
not be restricted until unless the public sphere is encroached.170 
168 Tunaya, Siyasal Partiler, 142-143. 
169 Zurcher, Unionist Factor, 5-20. 
170 Tunaya, Siyasal Partiler, 155. 
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. 
Article2: All male citizens, whether taxpayers or not, would have the 
right to vote. 
Article 11: The last part of the 113th Article of the Kanun-i Esasi, which 
is against individual liberty, would be abolished. 
Article 24: Monopoly is harmful for the interest of country. It is not 
permitted with the exception of compulsory situations. 171 
God created people equal from the aspect of law, but the Ottomans 
discriminated people on the basis of ranks. This created an antagonism among 
Ottoman citizens. This antagonism impeded the formation of a unified 
opposition against absolutist state tyranny. The Liberal Party believed that the 
strengthening of equality before law could limit the power of center and give 
birth to liberalism . 
. 
The name of Prince Sabahaddin was not mentioned in the Liberal Party's 
certificates. Also Ahmet Bedevi Kuran claimed that the Prince had no organic 
ties with Liberal Party. However, although the name of chairman was not 
mentioned in the certificate of the Party, the similarity between ideas in the 
Liberal Party and the FIDC programs made one believe that the Prince was 
the hidden head of the Liberal Party. Sabahaddin Bey was an outstanding 
figure. in Turkish liberalism. He was one of the most important persons 
outside the illiberal tradition. Main themes in his paradigm were an 
empowered individual, free entrepreneurship and a limited decentralized state. 
Strong and self sufficient individual was not emphasized so considerably ever 
before. He divided societies into categories according to the role of 
individuals; community-based ( tecemmiii) societies and individual-based ( 
infiradi) societies. Prince Sabahaddin perceived the lack of strong individuals 
171 Ibid., 158. 
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in the empire and his aim was to create the said kind of individual. 172In the 
community-based societies, like the Ottoman Empire, the individuals could 
not be self-confident and they were in need of trusting to their family, their 
community or their government. Such individuals live in society without 
having the ability to participate. On the other hand, in the individual-based 
societies the individual is self-confident and participant173in the community-
based society, in which community was dominant over individual, possible 
outcomes irrespective of the administrative system, were political absolutism 
and social misery.1 74in this society because individuals were not productive 
and participative, they could not be strong enough to struggle for their 
freedom against the state. Family and state did not create a sphere in which 
individuals could be active and self-sufficient, but they were depended on a 
powerful center175• in the individual-based societies, individuals' private lifes 
had priority over public life. Such a sphere paved the way to individual 
freedom which was the source of social development. Individuals were 
capable of adjusting themselves according to the changing conditions of life. 
Their ability to produce is another factor to gain their freedom from state 
domination. However, in the Ottoman Empire, the relation between public 
and private life was not to the advantage of private life. So individuals 
were not powerful enough to demand and exercise their rights within the 
public domain. They obeyed the political centre. The priority of private life 
over public life and creation of Western-type citizenship could eliminate this 
problem.176 
172 N.Nurettin Ege, Prens Sabahaddin Hayatz ve ilmi Mudafalarz (istanbul:Fakiilteler mabaasi,1954), 
196-196. 
173 ibid., 210. 
174 Mithat Baydur, "Ge~misten Gilnilmilze Prens Sabahaddin ve Adem-i Merkeziyet~ilik," 43-44 
175 C. Orban TOtengil, Prens Sabahaddin, (1stanbul:istanbul Matbaas1, 1954), 52 
176 Cenk Reyhan, "Tilrk Siyasal Dtl~Uncesinde Yol Aynm1: Aykm Bir Aydm Prens Sabahaddin ve 
DU~ilncesi," TUrkiye Gun/Ugu, 22(Spring 1993), 122 
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In the paradigm of Prince Sabahaddin, the situation of individual was strongly 
correlated with the form of state ( centralized or decentralized), productive 
force and education. An Anglo-Saxon kind of education, a decentralized state, 
and entrepreneurship were inevitable factors in the birth of strong 
individuals. 177 
The malady of weak individual could be healed by education178• But, first, 
the Ottoman education system should be changed, because that system did not 
create individuals but state officals who were in need of strong centre of 
confidence. British educational system was a good example for Prince 
Sabahaddin, who claimed that British education system created self-sufficient, 
self-confident, and participative individuals. After education they could 
survive by themselves without any help from any supportive centre. 179 The 
Ottoman educational system should satisfy the necassities of the age. It 
should be based on the principle of empowerd and self-confident individuals. 
The aim of education was not to graduate state officals, but to educate 
participative individuals who could succeed in every field of society by their 
own free action. School curricula should have changed to create strong 
individuals and free entrepreneurs. 180 
Prince Sabahaddin claimed that true freedom could be provided only by the 
endeavour of the free entrepreneurs. A kind of freedom given by the state was 
pseudo freedom and could not be long-standing and individual-based. Free 
entrepreneurs who were productive became self sufficient and participative in 
177 ~tikril Hanioglu, Bir Siyasal Dii~iiniir Olarak Doktor Abdullah Cevdet ve Zamam {istanbul: Urydal 
Ne~riyat, 1981), 200. 
178 H.Ziya Ulken, <;agd~, 333-334. 
179 Ege, Sabahaddin. 228-231; Reyhan, Aykzri, 123 
180 Ege, Sabahaddin, 310; Ttltengil, Prens, 43-45 
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social affairs. 181 Their productiveness make them powerful and they did not 
look for a higher confidence centre as the state officals did. He believed that 
absolutism and centralized state were the natural outcome of the society in 
which there were no free entrepreneurs and strong individuals. Centralization 
meant monopoly of the freedom by the state, domination and exploitation of 
the majority by the minority, and the elimination of the participative 
individuals. For a transition from centralization to decentralization, free 
entrepreneurs must be supported. 182 Without this transition no reform could 
not succeed as was the case of the CUP. 183 
In the paradigm of the Prince another link of the chain was the decentralized 
state which was the feature of individual-based societies.184 Strong individual, 
entrepreneurship and decentralized state were an indivisible whole. Free 
entrepreneurship was a method of working which facilitated the creation of 
individual and the decentralized state was a kind of administrative system 
which was essential for entrepreneurship. 185 He compared the situation of the 
Muslims and Christians within the Empire and concluded that the wealth and 
development of the Christians stemmed from their benefit from the practices 
of decentralization and that the Muslims should follow the same path. 
Prince Sabahaddin equated centralization with weak individuals .. The 
decentralization without strong individuals could be reached only by the state 
itself. But he opposed such a situation because he believed that every reform 
should be triggered on the level of individual. Otherwise, all institutional 
181 Ulken, <;agdcq, 334 
182 ~UkrU Hanioglu, Abdullah Cevdet, 198. 
183 Niyazi Berkes, Tiirkiye 'de Cagdcqla~ma, 390. 
184 TUtengil, Prens, 37. 
185 Ege, Sabahaddin, 88-89 
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reforms not based on the individual, would be meaningless. Individuals 
should be considered as a potent unit in all state institutions for a succesful 
reform. 186 Prince Sabahaddin criticized the CUP for taking that the 
constituion on the instituional level only without considering the importance 
of individuals. The aim of the constution was the control of people over the 
state. But in a community-based society in which individuals were not self 
sufficient to maintain their lives, their control over the state was impossible. 
So without the genesis of such strong individuals whatever the name of the 
administrative system constitutionalism, parlementarism or absolutism, the 
dominance of the state over individuals could not be hindered as in the case of 
the CUP.In such cases reforms became useless and state renewed itself. 187 
~erif Mardin claimed that until Prince Sabahaddin, intellectuals were 
reformist and aimed to tame the Ottoman system; they could not criticize the 
basics of the system, which were impediments to liberalism. However, Prince 
Sabahaddin criticized the basics of the system and emphasized the necessity 
of strong individual and limited state, which could open the doors for Turkish 
liberalism. 
186 Ege, Sabahaddin, 243. 
187 TUtengil, Prens, 30. 
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CONCLUSION 
REASONS FOR THE NON-GERMINATED TURKISH LIBERALISM 
I. Discourse Dilemma (Liberalism as a means of Opposition): 
In the Turkish experience with liberalism it was shown that 
Committees/parties were liberal in opposition but illiberal in government. An 
outstanding example was the Committee of Union and Progress, which had 
been a proponent of liberalism for a long time in opposition against Sultan 
Abdillhamid. Its program also included many liberal principles. Those 
principles were so emphatically written in the program that some authors such 
as Aykut Kansu claimed that the CUP was liberal and its aim was to 
transform society to a liberal democratic one. However, when it strengthened 
its position in the government, as Riza Nur claimed, it started to act no 
differently from Abdiilhamid. The Liberal Party and Liberal Union suffered 
from the acts of the CUP, as the CUP had suffered from the acts of Sultan 
Abdillhamid. 
2. Omnipotent State Understanding: 
As in the case of German liberalism, an Omnipotent State was inevitable for 
Turkish liberals, who were not against a strong and tamed state but only 
against the arbitrary and unlimited use of power by the State. This omnipotent 
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state understanding enabled the state to intervene in every field of activity. 188 
This omnipotent state without hesitation could encroach upon the rights and 
freedoms of people in the name of the safety of the state. 
This dilemma (strong state and protected individual) could openly be seen in 
the writings of Mizanc1 Murat who perceived the weakness of individuals in 
the Ottoman society and suggested empowerment of individuals on one hand, 
and he endeavered to strengthen the state on the other. He also claimed that 
in spite of its deficiencies the idea of an omnipotent state should not be 
totally dismissed. 
3. Dominance Of Politics Over Economy: 
In the Ottoman case the role of economic forces was not prominent in 
development of liberalism, because, contrary to Western Europe, in the 
Ottoman Empire the group who had political power controlled the group who 
had economic power. 189 As idris Kiiyiikomer claimed, the existence of a 
powerful economic group could debilitate the crude power of the state and 
limit its scope of activity, which was a prerequisite for liberalism. However, 
in the "Ottoman case there was no economic group which could bargain with 
political power. This was an obstacle for the development of liberalism, 
which is based on the consensus of political and economic groups. Only in the 
1910s did the economy become a prominent subject, but still not as an 
autonomous field but rather within the boundaries of the political sphere. The 
CUP government tried to create a national bourgeoisie and founded some 
188 Feroz Ahmad, Ittihatc1l1kten Kemalizme (1stanbul: Kaynak Yaymlan, 1986), 34. 
189 Idris KUcUkomer, Dilzenin Yabanc1l~mas1 (istanbul: Baglam Yaymlan, 1994), 29-53. 
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factories. This was similar to German case, where the economy was 
controlled by a few people, and generally state-supported or owned by the 
state itself. 
4. Negative Political Roles of Minorities: 
Ottoman liberals' demands focused on the equality among Ottoman subject 
without regard to religious and ethnic diversity and limiting arbitrary 
power.However, when the equality principle was established, the minorities did 
not support it. They demanded further rights and even an autonomous state. As 
in· the case of the first Ottoman Liberal Congress, the Armenian group declared 
that rather than equal citizenship they demanded an autonomous state. In time 
Albanians and Greeks within Empire aspired to have autonomous nation-states 
of their own.Such demands hindered the development of liberalism in two ways: 
a) If they supported the Constitution and its liberal principles, they could 
facilitate introduction of further principles in the Constitution; 
b) Their stubborn nationalist demands created its antithesis among the Young 
Turks, who disregarded liberal principles and proposed Turkish nationalism, 
which ·reversed the accumulation of liberal thought and stand in contrast to 
the notion of equal citizenship. 
5. Negative Economic Roles of Non-Turks: 
In the Ottoman Empire, Muslims generally favored military and state 
officialdom and disregarded commerce.Consequently commerce was in the 
hands of the Greeks and Armenians. If they had perceived the Empire as their 
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own state in which they could enhance their position in society, liberalism 
could have taken root by their taking roles similar to that of the bourgeoisie 
in Western Europe. However they conceived of the Empire as a state in which 
their future did not lie. They became a bourgeoisie who benefited from extra 
territorial privileges exploited by the Europeans under the Capitulations190• 
Many of them preferred to be foreign citizens and served the interests of 
foreign powers against those of the Ottomans. As a result, they were 
perceived as agents of European imperialist powers. They cooperated with 
the Great Powers after the nineteenth century and dominated the economic 
sphere. 
However, they did not use their economic power for bargaining with the 
political center for the improvement of liberal rights and weakening the crude 
state power, but instead they demanded an autonomous state of their own.As a 
consequence their economic influences did not serve to limit the arbitrary 
power of state by creating a domain of economic freedom which could 
nourish Ottoman liberalism. 
<;aglar Keyder claimed that if the Greek and Armenian bourgeoisie had tried 
to further their political aims within borders of the Empire as a whole, the 
Young Turk experiment between 1908-1918 could have resulted not in the 
form of bureaucratic reformism, but under the leadership of a young 
bourgeoisie, omnipotent state power could have been weakened and a liberal 
sphere created.191 
190 Mardin, Turk Modernleymesi, 87 
191 Caglar Keyder, Tiirkiye 'de Dev/et ve Smiflar (istanbul:ileti~im Yaymlar1, 1995), 71-10 I. 
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Later the migration and exclusion of the non-Muslim bourgeoisie eroded all 
the bourgeois accumulation that could well have led to liberal germination. 
After the emigration and exclusion of the minorities, the Committee took up 
the idea of creating a national economy and this paved the way for state 
domination over the economic sphere. 
6. German Influence on the Empire and the Rise of "National Economy": 
During this period the state tried to create a Turkish bourgeoisie and succeded 
to a degree. This was contrary to the experience of Western European liberal 
development, because in that case economy and politics were two 
contradictory domains. Struggle between those two domains paved the way 
. 
for a consensus which weakened state power and created a sphere of 
individual freedoms. However, by "National Economy", the state created a 
bourgeoisie who could not bargain with the political center and enlarge the 
liberal domain. 
7. No Security for Capital Accumulation: 
This was an outcome of politics over economy. As Bernard Lewis suggested, 
there were people as wealthy as that of Europeans in the Ottoman Empire, 
but those wealthy people could not use their property for gaining political 
power. This deficiency stemmed from insecurity of capital. The political 
center could seize any accumulation easily, and this impeded the birth of a 
Turkish bourgeoisie. The 1876 Constitution was a significant development in 
this case because it provided constitutional guarantees against arbitrary tax 
88 
collection. Inviolability of property was guaranteed and expropriation of any 
kind of property for whatever reason was forbidden. This aimed to create a 
native bourgeoisie who could help the formation of liberal state. Yusuf 
Ak~ura was one of the Ottoman intellectuals who perceived the meaning of 
the security of property and the necessity of a bourgeoisie who could be the 
backbone of a liberal state. 192 
7. Lack of a Cultural and Political Base for Power Sharing and Opposition: 
The struggle for liberalism usually results in a the creation a field of 
individual freedoms in both the political and the economic sphere. However, 
the CUP was careful to protect its power and tried to suppress the opposition 
in order not to share its power with the competing groups. The Liberal Party 
and Liberal Union did not practice their role as regards nourishing liberal 
principles, because they were accused of being separatists and allies of 
Greece. This resulted in the restriction of individual freedoms within the 
Liberal Party and Liberal Union and impeded liberal development. 
192 Zafer Toprak, TUrkiye'de Milli lktisat (Ankara: Yurt Yaymlar1, 1982), 410-411 
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